State Rules: Oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan
By Luke A. Patey *
The strategic behaviour of international oil companies in war-torn
Sudan was overwhelmingly driven by political pressures from
governments. After almost twenty years of operating in Sudan, the
American giant Chevron was pushed to withdraw due to deteriorating
relations between Washington and Khartoum. The Canadian flagship oil
company, Talisman, which helped kick-start oil development after
Chevron's exit also fell victim to Washington's ire. On the other
hand, the European junior oil companies, Lundin and OMV, protected by
the European Union's political standpoint of "constructive engagement"
in Sudan, were free to profit. Finally, the eastern parastatals, led
by a surging China, eager to capture international energy resources to
fuel their budding economies and supported by the plural relationships
fostered between their respective governments and the ruling,
riverine-elite in Khartoum, tactfully established a dominating
presence. While fervent international human rights advocacy alone
seemingly drove susceptible western firms out of Sudan, the real power
behind corporate movements came from the rules dictated by states.
INTRODUCTION
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) have played a significant role in
some of the most destructive civil wars of the developing world. From
Colombia, Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Azerbaijan, to Myanmar, MNC engagement has aggravated conflict and fed
pervasive corruption through the extraction of lucrative natural
resources, such as oil and natural gas, timber, diamonds, and other
precious minerals. The case of Sudan is yet another example where
economic development spurred on by MNC activity has had deadly
consequences, benefiting but a few in an impoverished population. For
the past fifty years, international oil companies have explored the
burning coasts and diverse terrain of the Sudan for precious "black
gold" amidst harrowing civil war. Mired in conflict since its
independence, it comes as no surprise that MNCs would become embroiled
in the dynamics of Sudan's second civil war between the central
government in Khartoum and the insurgent Sudan People's Liberation
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) from the South. Oilfields were heatedly
contested areas of strategic control between warring factions and
witness to horrendous human rights violations against civilian
populations. The activities of MNCs eventually provided Khartoum with
a source of revenue to strengthen its brutal military machine. As a
result, fervent international human rights advocacy moved to clear the
indirect, but nonetheless detrimental, corporate influence on an
already devastating civil war.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seemingly drove susceptible
western oil companies out of the war-stricken country. Paradoxically,
western abandonment allowed state-owned corporations from China,
Malaysia, and India, largely invulnerable to human rights pressures,
to form a stranglehold on Sudan's oil industry. However, lost in this
vast contradiction, was the real power behind these corporate
movements. An in-depth examination of the strategic behaviour of
international oil companies in Sudan finds that MNC decision-making is
dictated by an interaction between the distinct corporate character of
each company and their sensitivity to the conflict-risk factors
emerging from the host-country and international environment. In this
complexity of factors, regardless if it was an American major, Western
Junior, or upstart eastern state-owned corporation, rather than human
rights pressures exerting the overwhelming force on oil companies,
actual influence came from the political pressures of governments. The
directives of Washington and Beijing particularly stood out as the
reigning global power and its brazen challenger weighed in their
political and economic interests in Third World Sudan. State rules
directed corporate behaviour.
MULTINATIONALS AND ARMED CONFLICT
No longer over-shadowed by the patronage politics of the Cold War,
international NGOs presented the detrimental influence of corporations
in conflict-affected countries in connection with the 'blood diamonds'
and 'scorched earth' of contemporary civil war (see for instance
Global Witness, 1998). The emerging role of corporations in civil war
was also highlighted by the United Nations in its innovative 'name and
shame' campaigns (United Nations, 2001). In combination with these
advocacy and inter-governmental efforts, an ever-questioning academia
placed the activities of MNCs in conflict-affected countries within
the economic dimensions of 'new wars' (Kaldor, 2001; Duffield, 2001).
It was argued further that economic considerations, access to relief
aid and indeed an abundance of natural resources were crucial in
motivating warring groups (Jean & Rufin, 1996; Keen, 1998; Berdal &
Malone, 2000). Conflicts were seen to now contain a self-financing
nature with the exploitation of natural resources providing the fuel
and regional and international linkages in a globalized world the
ignition for civil war (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003). The emergence of
a market-driven global economy saw the proliferation of MNCs
throughout the world, further upsetting the socioeconomic and
political stability of conflict-affected countries, altering the
character and prolonging the length of civil wars.
So-called 'resource wars' have demonstrated the particular frustrating
resolve of private sector activity in undermining incentives for
peace. While some interventions, such as diamond smuggling, are
illicit in nature, aiming to profit directly from the instability of
war, others are legitimate, for instance MNC activity in Sudan's oil
industry, but nonetheless have an adverse influence on conflict
(Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2004: 24-32). Indeed, both governments and
rebel groups have utilized private sector actors as vehicles to earn
the needed revenue and establish the required international
connections to access military arms and continue fighting.
Furthermore, the private sector has provided a source of
self-enrichment for ruling elites, which in many cases has magnified
the political and social grievances that brought on conflict in the
first place. In response, international NGOs have spearheaded the
development of policy instruments, such as the Extractive Industry's
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and US/UK Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights, to influence a significant part of the
demand-side of the equation, MNCs, in order to alter the oppressive
and exploitive practices of governments in conflict-affected
countries, representing much of the supply-side. Extractive industry
corporations are essential in producing the value from natural
resources through enormous capital investments, advanced technology,
technical expertise and access to international markets.
Corporations in the extractive industries of petroleum, mining, and
timber represent much of the legitimate side of the private sector
prevalent in conflict-affected countries. These MNCs compared to their
counterparts in manufacturing or services more often remain in
conflict settings due to the sizeable, fixed, and capital-intense
nature of their investment. However, beyond these fundamental
attributes, extractive industry corporations should not be regarded as
one monolithic actor. Characteristics such as company size, market of
operation, and ownership structure differentiate corporations between
one another (Sherman, 2002: 9). For instance, in an industry dominated
by a handful of majors, junior-sized oil corporations have filled a
market niche by operating in the high-risk countries such as Sudan.
The contrast in characteristics between corporations is especially
stark when each MNC's country of origin is taken into consideration.
Corporations originating from North American or European countries,
where relatively high expectations of corporate responsibility exist,
are more compelled to take on human rights sensitive and financial
transparency measures to avoid emerging reputation and legal costs
that can be incurred in home markets (Ballentine & Nitzschke, 2004:
26). Alternatively, the state-owned oil companies of rising developing
economies, such as China, India, and Malaysia, have little pressure
from their home constituencies concerning the human rights
consequences of their activities in conflict settings. In fact, these
corporations have discovered a competitive advantage through operating
in conflict-affected countries given the reluctance of Western oil
majors to do so. Thus, given these emerging dynamics, the inherent,
long-term engagement of corporations is not related to an individual
MNC's investment, but simply MNC investment as a whole (Patey, 2006).
Some companies will venture where others stray specifically because of
the varying characteristics between them.
It is an interaction between company characteristics and conflict-risk
factors that dictates whether a MNC will enter or remain engaged in a
conflict-affected country. After a corporation is drawn in by
geological and economic details of the resource in question, it then
must consider a slew of conflict-risk factors, such as those related
to security, political expropriation, stoppage time due to suspended
operations, difficulties in raising capital, and potential litigation
and reputation costs that arise in home markets (Nelson 2000: 22-23;
Bray 2003). Thus, in accordance with their individual characteristics,
corporations aim to avoid conflict-risks transforming into company
costs. Understanding this decision-making process is critical in
comprehending MNC behaviour in conflict-affected countries. It is
certainly of value for uncovering the limitations of human rights
pressures on corporations and the effectiveness of policy instruments
forwarding conflict-sensitive practices. Even when considering
commercially legitimate MNC activity in the oil industry of Sudan, the
diversity of the global private sector has proven resistant to the
normative coercion of international NGOs. Altogether, the inherent
qualities of MNCs in the extractive industry make them central pieces
in the complex puzzle of economic calculations in contemporary civil
wars.
SUDAN, CIVIL WAR, AND OIL
There exist many impressions of Africa. One in particular is of a
continent overwhelmed by unrelenting civil war. Unfortunately, the
reality of conflict in Sudan falls squarely into this perception. A
former Anglo-Egyptian colony, Sudan gained independence in 1956 and
immediately fell into internal conflict. The civil war was largely one
of succession; a result of continual economic and political neglect of
the South by the northern government, a tendency that was an extension
of the country's colonial legacy. Following an eleven year span of
relative peace resulting from the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement
in 1972, regional marginalization still held meaning when the second
civil war broke out. Rather than outright independence, this was
largely a war of forming a "New Sudan" where inclusive governance
would become the norm. A collection of rebel groups in the South,
ever-distrustful of Khartoum, fought the government under the eventual
banner of the SPLA/M. The civil war further devastated the country,
particularly the South, leaving an estimated two million Sudanese dead
and double that amount displaced (International Crisis Group, 2002:
3-4). Beyond the popular portrayal of the conflict as one of racial
and religious hatreds, fought between Arabs and Africans or Muslims
and Christians, it seems that all the possible causes of civil war
that have long plagued the African continent found their way into the
meaning of Sudan's North-South civil war.
From the outbreak of the North-South civil war in the early 1980s till
its formal end after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA): greed, retribution, poverty, external intervention, and
religious and ethnic divides all motivated violence. However, the
overarching cause of the civil war remained the same as the one before
it: a historical consistency of oppressive governance from Khartoum in
promoting regional marginalization and exploiting social divisions
(Johnson, 2003). Indeed, at the turn of the century with the
North-South civil war approaching a formal end, Sudan was denied even
a moment's peace as longstanding sentiments of neglect and exploitive
intervention from the Khartoum government fostered growing rebellion
in the western region of Darfur, leading to a full-fledged civil war
(Prunier, 2005). It is in this context that the discovery and eventual
production of oil by international companies weighed its economic
might on civil war. The economic considerations in the civil war would
rise considerably as oil development progressed precariously along the
traditional North-South border.
It was no mere coincidence that oil was found in Sudan at the same
time as the return of civil war. In 1983, the Khartoum government, at
that time led by President Jaafar Mohammad al-Nimeiri, violated the
standing Addis Ababa Agreement and continued along historical lines of
political and economic marginalization of the South. In addition to
establishing Sharia law in the entire country, including the Christian
and animist South, and dissolving the Southern Regional Assembly,
Nimeiri moved to alter southern state boundaries to ensure the North
would have access to future oil earnings. The rising influence of the
Islamic brotherhood, led by then Attorney General, Hassan al-Turabi,
realizing the significance of Chevron's findings in the South would
later succeed in changing state boundaries once in power of the
government as the National Islamic Front (NIF). These ongoing
political and economic violations of established agreements inflamed
grievances among southerners to the point of war (Alier, 1990). As
civil war re-emerged in Sudan, Khartoum's political manoeuvres to
capture oil reserves would also be accompanied by on-the-ground
tactics that contributed to existing processes of the economic-related
violence that eventually would characterize the North-South civil war.
Similar to other incidences of intra-state war in the developing
world, one particular cause for the enduring character of civil war in
Sudan stems from combatants not necessarily seeking the defeat of the
opposing side, but rather the fulfillment of economic interests. While
the principle antagonists of war certainly fostered both political and
economic intentions behind their actions, the Sudanese government's
military sponsorship of Misiriyya and Baqqara nomadic tribes in the
North transformed violence into a way of life. Khartoum encouraged
ethnic tensions by granting Arabic herdsmen an unwritten license to
pillage and destroy the communities of the Dinka and Nuer African
pastoralists of the South; it would repeat this 'divide and rule'
tactic later in Darfur. The government wished to deny rebels access to
the resources and recruits these southern communities could provide,
prevent the SPLA from uniting destitute groups in the South with those
in the North, and ensure a power base that would later on, grant
access to lucrative oil reserves (Keen, 1998: 39). Since few other
economic opportunities existed in the country, deprived Arab nomads
sustained themselves by raiding southern communities, regardless of
their affiliation with the SPLA. As a consequence, grievances grew
within the settled populations and retribution was sought through
further violence. Thus, higher-level military directives to gain
control of oil-bearing regions bore local conflicts. Oil development
would also later empower Khartoum's brutal military campaign.
The Sudan Armed Forces was keen on laying waste to local communities
in the South to ensure there would be nothing to threaten oil
development. Along with its armed militias, Khartoum terrorized
civilian populations with Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships that
became more readily available as oil revenues grew. In the early
1990s, Khartoum further solidified its position by exploiting internal
divisions between the Dinka and Nuer ethnic ranks of the SPLA. The
resulting military advance and continual civilian displacement would
open up strategic oil-bearing areas (Johnson, 2003: 163).
International oil companies were seen as complicit in the violence and
displacement, providing the government with revenues for large
military purchases (Human Rights Watch, 2003). In sum, oil development
exacerbated the North-South civil war by representing an economic
prize for Khartoum that held aggravating consequences for conflict
dynamics at national and local levels. As the government advanced to
capture territory in oil-bearing regions and the SPLA moved to disrupt
exploration and extraction activities, the economic logic of the
conflict rose substantially. Similar to other cases of civil war in
the developing world, Sudan demonstrated that MNCs in the extractive
industry were essential as economic vehicles that allowed domestic
actors to realize value from natural resources. The detrimental
influence underlines the urgent need to find solutions that ensure
extractive industry corporations indeed 'do no harm' in
conflict-affected countries. However, without understanding the forces
that govern corporate decision-making, it is a futile task to attempt
to influence their movements and practices.
FIRST COME, FIRST SERVE: JUST DESSERTS FOR CHEVRON AND ARAKIS
It was the oil major Chevron from the United States that made the
first and most critical steps in advancing Sudan's oil industry. The
MNC also set the tone for future oil companies in the country by
demonstrating how corporate character would have to negotiate a
hostile domestic and international environment if petroleum resources
were to be exploited. Chevron had arrived in Sudan as a consequence of
international politics. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 and coinciding oil
embargo against the West for its support of Israel by King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia and other Arab states forever changed the nature of the
international oil industry. One result was that it drove western oil
companies to more aggressively explore for petroleum resources outside
the borders of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
In Sudan, although AGIP from Italy had made gas discoveries in the Red
Sea in the early 1960s, it was Chevron that made the bold move in the
1970s to conduct extensive onshore exploration activities, mapping out
the Muglad and Melut basins with major discoveries at Bentiu (later to
be renamed Unity), Heglig and Adar Yale. It was two years after the
signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, putting an end to
Sudan's first civil war, when Chevron was granted the right to explore
Sudan's onshore oil potential by President Nimeiri. And just as peace
brought to life the American giant's operations in Sudan, war would
bring them to an end.
Despite numerous discoveries, Chevron suspended plans to bring
Sudanese oil to market in 1984 after an attack on its facilities by
the rebel group Anyanya II killed three workers (Harker, 2000: 52). In
the eyes of many in the South, Chevron was clearly an ally of a
repressive northern government. The $1 billion Chevron and its
partners had invested was in jeopardy. The insecurity of operating in
the South became too much of a risk for the company to take given low
international oil prices. Some in the Ministry of Energy and Mining
(MEM) in Khartoum were skeptical that the blaze of three minutes of
gunfire at Chevron's Rebkona camp near Bentiu was enough justification
for the suspension. The insecurity sited by Chevron was regarded as a
pretext to simply waiting till the political or economic situation
made Sudan's relatively small oil reserves at the time more valuable
to exploit. Only with the conditions for a force majeure could Chevron
avoid its contract being rescinded by the government due to its
failure to fulfill its scheduled operational obligations.1 The fact
that the company had similar risky operations across the continent in
the war-torn, but more lucrative oil-region of Cabinda in Angola,
angered officials in Khartoum. Thus, the government was unsympathetic
to the company's stated dilemma and nonetheless threatened to
terminate its contracts if it did not move forward with operations
(The Wall Street Journal, 1984). The start of the second North-South
civil war and political upheaval in Khartoum would spare Chevron some
time, but when Omar al-Bashir became President of Sudan after a
bloodless military coup in 1989, orchestrated by Turabi's NIF,
Chevron's misfortune would continue.
Once Khartoum's elite had sorted themselves out, focus fell again on
the urgency to develop the country's oil resources. Funds were
required to fend off a surging SPLA and implement an ambitious
Islamitization project. The NIF understood the need to secure the
oilfields and moved towards gaining control of strategic areas in the
South by implementing a cordon sanitaire, a task that would be led by
proxy Mujahideen militias. However, Chevron had grown weary of the
revolving military and democratic governments in Khartoum throughout
the 1980s and was unconvinced that the NIF would last much longer than
its predecessors. Although the NIF was eager for the oil major to be
the company to develop its petroleum reserves, its utter need for
finances outweighed its patience, and it promptly threatened the
company to restart or lose its assets. For Chevron the legacy of
political ambiguity in Sudan and continual unattractive economic
conditions for the company as an oil major, seeking considerable
payoff, made Sudan not worth the hassle. More importantly, at the same
time, Chevron's own government in Washington was showing signs of
disapproval in Khartoum, not helping the company's increasingly weak
bargaining position.
The relationship between Sudan and the United States had went through
numerous political oscillations in the aftermath of the Six Day War in
1967 and throughout the Cold War, taking a downward plunge when the
Palestinian Black September group assassinated the US Ambassador in
Khartoum in March 1973, but recovering as Chevron became more active
in the country (Woodward, 2006: 30-31). Nonetheless, as civil war
broke-out in Sudan and Chevron suspended its operations, the United
States became uneasy with both the domestic situation, the imposition
of Sharia law set off alarm bells on Capital Hill, and its external
projections. Although Sudan was far from representing a major item on
Washington's foreign policy agenda, when the NIF came into power in
1989 with a strong Islamic stance, a series of resulting international
events would prove destructive to American-Sudanese relations. While
as Ambassador to the United Nations George HW Bush was keen to point
out potential petroleum wealth to Sudan, as President in a post-Cold
War era he was less-inclined to maintain positive relations with
Khartoum. In Washington, Khartoum's open-door policy to every Islamic
militant group on the planet, including rising US nemesis Osama bin
Laden, its support of Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, and links with
the World Trade Center bombings in New York in 1993 and two years
after an attempted assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak
in Addis Ababa, was enough to place Sudan on the US list of states
sponsoring terrorism as well as lead to the imposition of UN sanctions
(Ibid.: 53). Therefore, in addition to pressure from Khartoum to
either restart its activities or face expulsion, Chevron's fate was
sealed when relations between its home and less-than-gracious host
government completely deteriorated. The company pulled out of Sudan in
1992. But the end of the Cold War would also present promising
opportunities. The reopening of the Caspian Sea Region for
international oil companies led Chevron into independent Kazakhstan,
with the American government providing the incentive of an impressive
$550 million tax write-off for its travails in war-torn Sudan (The
Globe and Mail, 1999). Altogether, political pressures from Washington
and Khartoum forced the MNC to exit. The NIF had lost access to the
world's biggest economy but was now free to break away from Nimeiri's
shadow and manage Sudan's promising oil industry as it pleased.
The immense financial power and seasoned experience of Chevron was
replaced by an unknown company from Canada which only experience in
the oil industry was in developing the gas wells of Kentucky. The
contrast could not have been more obtuse. However, there was a method
to Khartoum's seemingly bald-faced madness. It was partially a
question of control, but more so one of necessity. The NIF wanted its
house in order after having to play high-politics with Chevron and
Washington. It thus relied on personal connections through a string of
small-sized companies to push forward the advancement of its oil
industry (Coalition for International Justice, 2006: 9-11). Chevron
sold its concessions at Unity and Heglig, Blocks 1, 2, and 4, to a
private Sudanese corporation, ConCorp for the bargain basement price
of $23 million. ConCorp's lack of experience in the oil industry and
ties with Hassan al-Turabi through owner Mohamed Abdullah Jar el-Nabi
clearly revealed Khartoum's demand for control. However, in rapid
fashion el-Nabi sold the concessions to State Petroleum Corporation, a
company existing more on paper than actuality from Vancouver, Canada.
State was established by its owner Lutfur Khan - who had his own
connections with the NIF - solely to gain the rights to Sudan's
oilfields (Middle East Economic Digest, 1993). But the fact was
neither ConCorp nor State could produce many actual results in terms
of oil development. When Arakis took over its fellow Canadian firm
State in 1994 it was clear that little had changed. It simply fell
well short of possessing the required capital to launch significant
oil production through an export pipeline, and continually failed to
raise the appropriate finances, leading the company into shady
dealings that resulted in severe legal turmoil (The Oil Daily, 1998).
Such an outcome could have been avoided if it was not for Washington's
apparent interjection that denied Arakis the opportunity to enter
American financial markets (The Oil Daily, 1999). Arakis may have been
the champion of the neophytes, but it definitely was not up for the
task of developing Sudan's petroleum resources.
The withdrawal of Chevron and deteriorating relations with Washington
meant that a large portion of the international oil industry, namely
American companies, was off limits to Sudan. Similar to Chevron, other
oil majors such as British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total had
shied away from exploration and production activities in the
conflict-ridden country during the 1980s. As a result, rather than
representing a calculated strategy by the NIF to use small-sized oil
companies due to their disposition to turn-a-blind eye to gross human
rights violations in oil-bearing regions (Coalition for International
Justice, 2006: 41), it was a lack of available options in the early
1990s that was key to the decision. A transition period had to be
taken to find willing, but also capable, corporate partners. Arakis
may have navigated the political waters in Khartoum well, but it was
clear that companies interested in entering Sudan also needed the
appropriate finances, experience, and technology to succeed. Later,
Khartoum would manage to assemble a grouping of Western junior-sized
oil companies and state-owned corporations from the East to do just
that.
WESTERN JUNIORS: MARKET EXCEPTIONS IN WAR-TORN SUDAN
After the oil price crash of 1986, mid-sized, independent oil
companies predominantly from the West were facing a predicament. Since
junior oil companies are more susceptible to price fluctuations than
majors, given the relatively limited span of their international
operations, they were forced more so than in the past to carve a niche
market out of conducting exploration activities in places the oil
majors would generally not enter (The Economist, 1998). These
companies also typically could avoid boycott pressures often feared by
oil majors given their lack of downstream operations. Thus, when
Arakis sold 75% of its rights to Blocks 1, 2, and 4 in December 1996
to form the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), a
consortium with the state-owned companies: China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) at 40%, Petronas from Malaysia (30%) and Sudapet,
the national Sudanese oil corporation (5%), industry confidence grew
in the possibility of bringing Sudan's oil to market. The new
partners, particularly the Chinese, would supply the long sought after
funds to advance the development of a 1,600 km pipeline to Port Sudan
(Petroleum Economist, 1998). These developments and a lack of American
competition spurred on Canadian and European oil juniors to enter the
Sudan gamble.
In 1998, with Arakis still having financial problems, its Canadian
counterpart, Calgary-based Talisman would purchase the company and
provide the final financial and technical thrust needed to bring
Sudan's oil industry quickly online a year later. Talisman was a
Western Junior with a major legacy, having once been the Canada branch
of British Petroleum. It insisted on having control of the procurement
department at GNPOC as part of its 25% share in the consortium and
through it would very much direct the technical progress of GNPOC.2
Talisman was Canada's flagship oil company and eager to find strong
growth possibilities on the frontier of the international oil
industry, aiming for a 20% increase in production (The Wall Street
Journal, 1998). Over the next three years, the MNC would succeed in
fulfilling the goal. Sudan quickly developed into one of the company's
prize assets. In 2002, the Canadian firm's production shares from
GNPOC were close to matching its results in traditional North American
operations; Sudan represented 22% of the company's total oil
production (Talisman, 2002: 5). Talisman benefited from rising output
and the relatively low production costs in Sudan, making up for a lack
of growth in its other international operations. However, the company
was not the only one profiting from oil production. Oil revenues had
given Khartoum a significant financial lift, allowing it to enhance
its military capabilities. Arms purchases from Russia and China
allowed the government to increase its use of Antonov bombers and
helicopter gun-ships to flatten villages in the South and guarantee an
undisturbed flow of oil. However, the strategy had its consequences.
In North America and Europe, international oil companies operating in
Sudan were increasingly seen as accomplices in the mass displacement
and killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians. Talisman was
particularly susceptible to these pressures as the Canadian company
had significant institutional shareholders with no interest in being
associated to the violence. However, despite the intense reputational
damage the company was suffering, it was a threat to its capital
raising capability on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that made it
pay notice. Washington was far from finished with Khartoum. US foreign
policy in Sudan went from reactionary to coercive by the late 1990s.
The NIF's misadventures in terrorism eventually led the Clinton
administration to impose US sanctions on Sudan in 1997 and support
Khartoum's regional enemies in an effort to bolster the SPLA's
position in hopes of a regime change on the Nile (Woodward, 2006:
93-99). Furthermore, in August 1998, three days after Talisman
announced its engagement in Sudan, American Tomahawk cruise missiles
slammed into a suspected chemical weapons plant in Khartoum North.
Despite this the mood in Washington remained somewhat nonchalant and
uncoordinated concerning Sudan until George W Bush was elected
President in 2001. Sudan held an important place on Bush's Africa
agenda given the interest of conservative-Christian republicans and
the Congressional Black Caucus in seeing an end to the conflict and
its many ills (Ibid.:113-17). Lobbying efforts completely cornered
Khartoum when they were fortified further by the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee. Consequently, the US Congress passed the
Sudan Peace Act that enhanced its humanitarian support in the country,
brought it closer to the peace effort than ever before, but also
included the provision of barring companies engaged in the country's
petroleum industry from raising capital on US financial markets (The
Wall Street Journal, 2001). The latter point represented an
unprecedented threat to Talisman's position.
Talisman's own government in Ottawa had taken another route. Although
it expressed its concern and examined the company's activities in
Sudan, it appeared more interested in the expansion of the Canadian
oil industry overseas than sanctioning potential complicity in human
rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 394). Nevertheless, the
delisting threat from the US government alone would prove to be more
than enough to force Talisman out of Sudan. Although the US Senate
later dropped the capital market provisions out of the Sudan Peace Act
due to the precedent it could lead to in weakening the competitiveness
of US financial markets, a notable expression of Washington's own
economic limits in protecting human rights, the mere likelihood of
being taken off the NYSE heavily discounted Talisman's stock price at
24% less than similar companies in the industry (The Wall Street
Journal, 2003). Talisman announced the sale of its Sudan assets on 30
October 2002, obviously preparing to exit Sudan even before the final
version of the Sudan Peace Act was passed by the US Senate earlier in
the same month. In the end, with Sudan's past links to terrorism as a
backdrop, widespread activism proved effective against the Canadian
firm preciously because it aligned with political pressure from
Washington that was not overburdened by economic interests as the
Sudanese oil sector was void of American companies. Talisman had made
a hefty profit of 296 million Canadian dollars from the sale of its
interests in GNPOC to the Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC) of India.
However, in reflection of GNPOC's increasing production levels and
Talisman's income of 184, 210, and 310 million Canadian dollars
respectively from 2000 to 2002 (Talisman, 2002: 55), the company was
obviously in a poor bargaining position. It was pushed to abandon a
growing asset in the face of mounting political pressure from
Washington. Indeed, after the exit, company strategy revolved around
the concept of "post-Sudan" (Ibid: 2-4). Company production levels
would take a blow, but mounting world oil prices offset the loss
(Talisman, 2003: 24). While Talisman was an obvious victim to its
political environment, other Western Juniors had similar, but less
inflicting experiences in Sudan.
The Chinese constructed pipeline headed towards Port Sudan would have
the capacity to handle more than just GNPOC production. This attracted
other western companies to Sudan. In the adjacent Block 5A, the
International Petroleum Corporation, previously active in the offshore
Red Sea region of Sudan, was directed by its parent company, Lundin
from Sweden, to enter the more promising onshore melee in 1997. Lundin
would form a consortium, later known as the White Nile Petroleum
Operating Company (WNPOC) with Petronas, OMV from Austria, and Sudapet
in Blocks 5A and 5B of Unity and Jonglei state. Lundin was an
explorer. Rather than the large-sized payoffs sought by the oil
majors, Lundin focused its efforts on discovering petroleum deposits,
and when findings were developed enough to be commercially viable,
selling the assets to prospective producers. It was not overly
preoccupied with long-term stability and willing to negotiate the
political and physical hazards that Sudan presented. The other
European company, OMV, entered Sudan as financial partner, keen to
expand both its international exploration and production activities.
Similar to Talisman, the commercial aspirations of the two European
companies would be hampered by allegations of complicity in human
rights abuses. However, unlike Talisman, a lack coinciding effective
political pressure from states would make the repercussions of these
allegations less severe.
The European Union stance of 'constructive engagement' with Sudan
would act as a political shield for Lundin and OMV. Both companies
forwarded their belief that oil development would contribute to
economic and social development in Sudan, but also noted explicitly
that the EU's political position supported this understanding (OMV,
2001a; Lundin, 2001a). However, the companies were not completely
sheltered from the realities of civil war. In the first years of the
new millennium, the contours of war in Sudan would shift as southern
armed groups battled one another and Khartoum alike around the
oilfields, loyalties swaying between rival factions. As a result,
Lundin was forced to suspend activities following several attacks on
its operations bringing OMV along for the ride (Lundin, 2002). As a
financial partner in the consortium, the Austrian firm would remain
attached to Lundin's precarious coattails. Nonetheless, commercial
success was achieved when Lundin discovered the lucrative Thar Jath
field in January, 2001. However, the celebration would be short-lived.
On-the-ground violence from the civil war translated into an
international publicity storm for the companies. The focus of
international NGO campaigns was the violent legacy of Lundin's
infamous oil road (Christian Aid, 2001). In reaction, Lundin went
political. In addition to welcoming Swedish and foreign journalists to
visit its operational area, it invited the governor of Unity State,
where its cherished Thar Jath field was located, to Sweden to
demonstrate the company's positive influence on local communities
(Lundin, 2001b). Lundin saw exceptional circumstances force it to
detach itself from its apolitical principles. It engaged board member
and former Swedish Prime Minister and UN Special Envoy, Carl Bildt, to
join the ranks of peace makers in Sudan and underline the opportunity
oil development provided in building such an outcome (Batruch, 2004:
13). In spite of this intrigue, in contrast to Talisman, for both
Lundin and OMV, pressure from their home governments or Washington
simply did not have the same capital market threats. The companies
were permitted to be their profit-seeking selves.
A lack of real political pressure from governments allowed the
European companies to reap financial rewards from exiting Sudan In
2003, Lundin sold its rights in Blocks 5A to Petronas from Malaysia
for $142.4 million. While there was further opportunity in developing
the concession, the costs of considerable stoppage times from
insecurity concerned headquarters, and when Petronas made its
impressive offer the decision became clear. OMV followed suit by
divesting from both its concessions, selling them to ONGC for 105.6
million Euros. Both companies were poised to use the sale as a
launching pad to expanding their international activates. For Lundin,
the sale of Block 5A in Sudan allowed it to enter a higher echelon of
the oil industry. In a large part, this was through the purchase of
acquisitions in North Sea that considerably increased the company's
petroleum reserves and production levels (Lundin, 2003: 5). As
international oil prices increased, Lundin's new-found producer status
elevated its earnings profoundly from in the red at - 41,983 million
SEK in 2001 to 993,975 million SEK in 2005 (Lundin 2001c: 26; Lundin,
2005: 45). Indeed, crude oil prices went from an average of $27.34 bbl
in 2003 to $54.52 in 2005 (BP, 2006: 16). With higher production
levels resulting from purchases made from the Sudan sale, the
coincidental sharp rise in oil prices allowed Lundin to complete the
transition of moving from a company highly reliant on one risky
venture to one boasting a diverse set of international operations and
a profitable future. As for OMV, it backtracked from its expansionist
agenda in its 'prime growth area' of North Africa and the Middle East
by selling out from Sudan (OMV, 2001b). Instead, the Austrian company
made the largest acquisition in its history by reverting back to the
security and stability of the Central and Western Europe market
through the purchase of a majority stake in the Romanian gas and oil
company, Petrom (OMV, 2004: 42). The result was a dramatic increase in
reserve and production levels that with escalating oil prices would
vastly improved the company's fortunes. Net income rose from 393
million Euros to 1,495.8 million Euros from 2003 to 2005 (OMV, 2003:
67). The sale of its Sudanese assets freed up funds to purchase Petrom
and made the rise in oil prices that much sweeter.
Unlike Talisman, Lundin and OMV held a political position in Sudan
that permitted significant economic rewards. The extractive industry
has a long history of risk-taking, with a particularly high failure
rate in exploration activities. However, risk levels increase greatly
when companies move into the production stage, most notably in
conflict-affected countries, because fixed assets are highly
susceptible to the physical and political environment (Bray, 2005:
7-8). As a result, corporate managers are taskmasters of ensuring
predictability and mitigating risk (Zandvliet, 2005: 195). Sudan
offered the opposite. The European oil companies, bearing witness to
the trails and tribulations of their Canadian counterpart, were not
keen on suffering the same fate should they move to production in
Sudan. Hopes of oil production at the time appeared fleeting compared
to those in more traditional markets. Thus, human rights pressures
only had severe negative consequences for the Western Juniors when
supported by the policies of governments that had the political power
to influence their corporate behaviour. Washington pushed Talisman to
discard a lucrative investment at a questionable price, while European
policy gave Lundin and OMV the room to leave Sudan with lasting
financial benefits. Despite these different outcomes, the Western
Juniors would reveal another, more paradoxical result, from their exit
of Sudan.
THE LAST LAUGH: THE HOLLOW ECHO OF THE EASTERN OIL MONOPOLY
In the end, besides clearing the conscience of many in the West,
disinvestment campaigns against oil companies did not weaken Khartoum.
The government's economic lifeline would remain intact. A brief but
prosperous flirtation with junior-sized oil companies and escalating
demand from eastern economies to secure international petroleum
resources in the late-1990s protected Khartoum from the normative
eruption of the West. State-owned oil companies from China, Malaysia,
and India would dominate Sudan's oil industry as the Western Juniors
pulled-out. Fittingly, it was China, with the most urgent energy
demands that moved first. In 1995, Beijing's powerhouse oil company,
CNPC, quietly bought the former Chevron concession of Block 6 in
Western Kordofan and in the following years would tactfully begin to
takeover Sudan's oil industry. CNPC took the lead of the GNPOC in 1997
when Arakis sold much of its interest in the consortium. Khartoum had
three priorities in evaluating bids made by the international oil
companies that gathered to win the GNPOC concessions: the favourable
terms to the government of the Arakis contract be kept, the companies
involved would have the appropriate finances to develop the oil
resources, and the construction of an export pipeline took place in
rapid succession. CNPC satisfied all of the above and outbid the field
by offering the government an oil refinery.3 With Washington's
watchful eye on the proceedings, such political gifts were not part of
the repertoire of the western companies at the table. Unlike their
eastern counterparts, the logics of western companies are largely
driven by the financial merits of agreements, where the cost of
borrowing from international banks must be sound to garner the
required investment.
The march continued for CNPC later on when in 2001 the Chinese company
bought a similar commanding share in the Petrodar Operating Company
(PDOC) in Blocks 3 and 7 of Upper Nile State. In each of CNPC's
concessions, it maintains the majority stake as operator in
partnership with Sudapet and other foreign oil companies. This
necessity of control is critical to China. The rising economic giant
has to ensure access to international petroleum reserves to offset its
own depleting energy resources and a skyrocketing demand from its
bulging economy. Sudan was the test project for what was the beginning
of a global undertaking for China; a reinvigoration of the scramble
for Africa with the attainment of energy resources as the top
priority. CNPC's investment in GNPOC represented the largest overseas
oil project ever pursued by a Chinese firm (China Business Information
Network, 1997). Outside of simply buying oil on the open market,
China' state-owned companies had now moved to take control of
international oilfields. At first this took place in pariah states,
such as Sudan, abandoned by the oil majors, but China has quickly
raised the stakes and entered more steward oil-producing countries in
Africa, such as Nigeria and Angola, all in an effort to access and
control energy resources for its economy. In these geopolitical
maneuvers, company and country act as one. Beijing's control over CNPC
is unquestionable and clearly reflected in the company's corporate
policies (CNPC, 2003: 7). However, CNPC's governmental shackles are
anything but restrictive.
In Sudan, on top of giving CNPC the financial leeway to win Sudanese
oilfields with extraordinary bids, China has developed a close
political, economic, and military relationship with Khartoum. As a
result, CNPC's position in the country's oil industry has been
significantly leveraged. Beijing has developed a closer relationship
with Khartoum by investing in various economic sectors in Sudan,
outside of the oil industry, providing soft loans throughout the years
(China Daily, 1995), and given Sudan greater access to military arms
(The Washington Post, 2004). On the political stage, China also
frustrated and stalled western efforts at the United Nations Security
Council to apply economic and political sanctions against Khartoum
(China Business News, 2004a). Altogether, the multi-faceted support
provided by China to Sudan has secured CNPC's authoritarian position
in Sudan's the two largest producing consortiums, GNPOC and PDOC. But
such access to Sudan's oilfields in the midst of civil war comes with
a meddlesome caveat: violence. CNPC was no stranger to the insecurity
of armed conflict in Sudan. Among the incidents that were reported, an
attack on an exploratory drilling rig by the SPLA and the kidnapping
of company employees hindered activities (China Business News, 2004b;
Gagnon & Ryle, 2001: 27). CNPC's experience is simply a reflection of
the environment. No company was above civil war in Sudan. Its
existence significantly slowed down oil development. However, despite
the insecurity, the drive of CNPC's governmental directors to acquire
energy resources pushed the company through the fog of war. In
addition to insecurity, the civil war also created another worrisome,
yet short-lived threat to CNPC's supremacy. Not surprisingly, the
source was the American government.
Washington's problems with Khartoum would frustrate CNPC's efforts to
expand its international presence. It did so by limiting the Chinese
company's access to the immense capital offerings that American
financial markets offer. In 1999, CNPC aimed to take a significant
step forward by listing shares on the NYSE, the Mecca of capital
markets for the oil industry, through an initial public offering.
However, the bid met vehement opposition in the United States due to
Washington's foreign policy on Sudan, exemplified by the Sudan Peace
Act. Even after CNPC insisted that the bid would only be for
PetroChina, a subsidiary with activities in China alone, the final
result was deflated from an expected $15 billion to $2.9 billion due
to the political opposition (Human Rights Watch, 2003: 463-67).
Nonetheless, although the outcome may have slowed down CNPC's
international expansion, the tangible effects of human rights
pressures were minimal in limiting CNPC's operations in Sudan.
Ultimately, the financial clout of the PetroChina bid allowed CNPC to
gain access to American markets due to the failure of the Sudan Peace
Act to attach capital market restrictions to its terms. As for the
human rights accusations directed towards the company, these were
answered with utter silence, clearly reflecting CNPC's shielded
position as a state-owned company from a non-democratic country. In
fact, the only significant influence political pressure from
Washington and human rights advocacy had on CNPC were in helping to
clear the way of susceptible, western competitors. The powerful
influences on CNPC in Sudan are the insecurity of civil war that has
limited and delayed operations, the positive relationship fostered
between Khartoum and Beijing, and most importantly, the increasing
demand in China for energy resources. This governmental push outdid
all the discouraging pulls that threatened to rip the company away
from achieving its lofty goal in Sudan.
In a similar fashion to China, Malaysian and Indian state-owned
companies would also carve out their own place in Sudan's oil
industry. A lack of oil majors and then of western competitors
altogether guided the expansion of Petronas and ONGC in the country.
Petronas, Malaysia's largest company entered Sudan in 1997, expanding
on its already extensive international operations by buying a 30%
stake in GNPOC. Petronas also owned a 28.5% interest in the Lundin
operated Block 5A, before also purchasing the Swedish firm's majority
share in 2003. Lastly, Petronas is part of PDOC in Blocks 3 and 7 as
well as holding interests in Blocks 8 and 15. The company's holdings
in Sudan represent its largest foreign onshore operation (Petronas,
2002: 24). In addition to its extensive upstream activities in Sudan,
Petronas is also active in the downstream industry with petrol
stations, sea terminals, and the construction of a $1 billion oil
refinery. Indeed, the Minister of Energy and Mining, al-Jaz, remarked
that Petronas and its government sponsor 'are friends of yesterday,
today, and tomorrow, who came to Sudan during difficult circumstances'
(Sudan Tribune, 2005). Despite the challenging conditions, India's
largest integrated oil and gas corporation, ONGC, would also extend
its friendship to Sudan by purchasing the abandoned interests in GNPOC
and Block 5A and 5B in 2003 and increase its own downstream activities
in the country (Oil and Gas Update India, 2004). Such sentiments of
gratitude towards eastern, state-owned companies from al-Jaz are
common among the few that have benefited from oil development in
Sudan. However, not everyone has felt so obliged to express their
thanks.
The SPLA certainly objected to the activities of Petronas and OGNC in
Sudan. As an operator, Petronas was directly influenced by the civil
war. During the conflict, company personnel were kidnapped and killed
and considered a Sudan posting to be a national service (New Straits
Times, 2000). Security concerns consistently delayed oil development
and prohibited any major activity in the company's southern concession
of Block 5B. However, eager to capitalize on the opportunity left by
western abandonment, Petronas stayed the course in Sudan as part of a
larger effort to access new foreign oil and gas sources (The Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2003). For ONGC, as a financial partner in Sudan,
it was indirectly influenced by the civil war. Its engagement in the
country was driven by Indian government policy to expand and diversify
international sources of petroleum. India is largely dependent on
foreign reserves and great concern exists concerning future access to
fuel a growing economy (Business Standard, 2002). Consequently, ONGC
has set the objective of doubling its reserves by the year 2020,
pursuing international opportunities aggressively (ONGC, 2005). A
relatively new player to the international oil industry, similar to
its eastern counterpart CNPC, Sudan is a learning experience for ONGC
to help in the expansion of its international activities. The shipment
of crude from GNPOC in 2003 to India was the first such delivery of
Indian-owned oil from a foreign source, prompting the country's Deputy
Prime Minister to proclaim: 'this is not imported oil, this is India's
oil' (Oil and Gas Journal, 2003). Thus, despite the continuous threats
of civil war in Sudan, Petronas and ONGC had a higher national purpose
that brought them into the war-stricken country. Correspondingly, this
inherent government connection bolsters the companies' standing in
Sudan's oil industry.
Also along the same lines as Beijing, Kuala Lumpur and New Delhi
encouraged the movements of their parastatals by developing plural
relationships with Khartoum. Islamic ties between Malaysia and Sudan
fostered Petronas entry and expansion. Malaysian investment in
multiple sectors of the economy and the facilitation of arms deals
cemented the company's strong position in Sudan (Christian Aid, 2001:
19). The subtle Indians established bilateral cooperation with Sudan
in textiles, information technology, and infrastructure projects (The
Financial Express, 2004). Overall, the positive relations between
their respective governments have allowed the eastern companies to
maintain strong positions in Sudan. These governmental relations
demonstrate the bullish attitude to develop Sudan's oil industry that
overcame the insecurity of civil war and brushed-off the political
demands of human rights activists. The success of the eastern
state-owned companies stems from their home governments demand for
international oil reserves in a domestic setting void of the standard
western competition. This was made conducive by the almost complete
invulnerability of their corporate characters to the same political
threats that so shrewdly ushered out the Western Juniors. Whereas
Chevron and Talisman left Sudan due to deteriorating relations between
the United States and Sudan, the governments of CNPC, Petronas, and
ONGC directed their companies into the open arms of Khartoum. The
eastern companies were able to avoid conflict-risks presented by the
host-country and international environment translating into company
costs. As a result, they succeeded in controlling Sudan's lucrative
oil industry.
CONCLUSION
The prominence of political pressures from governments on corporate
behaviour in Sudan is not an isolated incident. Casual observation
elsewhere in conflict-affected countries reiterates the weighty
influence of state actors on MNCs. In Angola, when British Petroleum
moved to disclose payments made to the Angolan government, it was
immediately faced with threats of losing its license to operate in the
oil-rich country from the ruling party (Global Witness, 2002: 41-42).
The warning silenced similar transparency initiatives from other oil
companies. Elsewhere, the risk of expulsion from Chad due to the
government's demand for payment of overdue taxes led both Chevron and
Petronas to capitulate to the stately demands despite their opposition
to the claims (BBC News Online, 2006). The authority and power of
governments is the essential factor opening and closing the doors for
oil companies in conflict-affected countries. In Sudan, both the
corporate behaviour of market-driven, western oil companies and their
parastatal counterparts from Asia were guided by the position and
influence of states towards their operations. Human rights pressures
only seemed effective when transmitted through a government with both
little existing economic interest in the country and the ability to
influence the targeted company.
The emergence and character of companies from the uprising economies
of the East have particularly stood out in Sudan and elsewhere, due to
their current clear disregard for the demands of international NGOs,
laying a devastating blow to human rights and transparency efforts.
This has heightened the collective action problem obstructing the use
of companies as levers to influence oppressive and corrupt
governments. However, one evident area of common ground for companies
from every corner of the globe is state rules. Human rights groups
keen on making a lasting impact in conflict-affected countries where
the presence of MNCs worsen conditions should maintain a focus on
engaging their home governments and new economic powers in Beijing and
elsewhere. The acceptance of normative positions by states is vital to
ensuring corporations act with conflict-sensitive practices in mind.
The involvement of governments in EITI and the Voluntary Principles as
well as efforts to specifically bring China and India into the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are commendable and promising
endeavours, but arduous tasks to complete. The political and economic
interests of strong states are formidable barriers to overcome in
increasing pressure on resource-rich, repressive governments in
Africa. However, resolve and attention is warranted given the
real-life stakes to populations. Altogether, while insecurity from the
civil war certainly guided much of the activity of all oil companies
in Sudan and external pressures from human rights groups and internal
corporate requirements for profit maximization were notable for
western firms, it was the demands of the domestic government in
Khartoum, the home governments of each company, and the long-reach of
Washington, that ultimately dictated corporate behaviour. While there
may very well be numerous economic reasons for companies to adopt
conflict-sensitive practices, hard politics through interactions with
states and those between states themselves stand-out as the decisive
factor in MNC decision-making.
* The author is researcher at the Danish Institute for International
Studies; 56 Strandgade, Copenhagen, Denmark 1401. He can be reached at
lpa@diis.dk. This paper is in published the Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 28, No. 5, 2007
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20 JULY 2007 00:49, BY JayJanson
I once worked on a documentary for an anniversary of the African
Development Bank and although never was in Darfur, I was close enough
to the Sudan border in Ethiopian and Kenya and have a spot in my heart
for the magnificent people of this region. I just knocked out this
article when I remembered, (I'm well into my 70s) of U.S. backing the
rebels was never being factored in.
By the way, I wonder and ask you as someone more conversant on the
Sudan than I, whether or not the U.S. is still actively supporting the
rebellion
s, either materially or diplomatically, either openly or secretly.
sentimentally, morally and/or spiritually.?
Appreciativly in advance should you have time to read my article below
and comment,
Jay Janson
Dear International Secretariat Amnesty International Staff,
While there is great sorrow and indignation over the suffering and
loss of life in the Sudan, early U.S. involvement in the war goes
unmentioned. Instead, the U.S. leads an effort to condemn China for
buying Sudan's oil. For years the U.S. had paid for war in hopes to
arrange for some eventual control of the oil discovered in Darfur,
(all well once well reported in the New York Times). The human crises
receives little financial aid from a U.S. government, silently
protected from any embarrassment of acknowledging a prime complicity
in fomenting war in Darfur.
HistoryNewNetwork, George Mason University published the folloing:
"Early CIA Involvement in Darfur Has Gone Unreported"
http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/34473.html HNN Darfur
as well as Global Research, Operation Sudan of SaveDafur, UK
IndyMedia, Ethiopian News, FreeThoughtManifesto, Islamic Forum,
Countercurrents, Nicholas D. Kristof, Schema-Root news, jcturner23's
reviews, NewsTrust,News Search Tracker, alfatomega, Newsvine, Digg,
Netscape, Boreal Access, Newswire, Tailrank, Congo Music News, Zaire,
mideastyouth.com, Darfur News from Google, ibrattleboro.com and sundry
other sites from the original in OpEdNews, January 23, 2007
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_jay_jans_070121_darfur___hand_ringin.htm
There has been a glaring omission in the U.S. media presentation of
the Darfur tragedy. The compassion demonstrated, mostly in words,
until recently, has not been accompanied by a recognition of U.S.
complicity, or at least involvement, in the war which has led to the
enormous suffering and loss of life that has been taking place in
Darfur for many years
In 1978 oil was discovered in Southern Sudan. Rebellious war began
five years later and was led by John Garang, who had taken military
training at infamous Fort Benning, Georgia. "The US government
decided, in 1996, to send nearly $20 million of military equipment
through the 'front-line' states of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda to
help the Sudanese opposition overthrow the Khartoum regime."
[Federation of American Scientists fas.org]
Between 1983 and the peace agreement signed in January 2005, Sudan's
civil war took nearly two million lives and left millions more
displaced. Garang became a First Vice President of Sudan as part of
the peace agreement in 2005. From 1983, "war and famine-related
effects resulted in more than 4 million people displaced and,
according to rebel estimates, more than 2 million deaths over a period
of two decades."
[CIA Fact Book -entry Sudan]
The BBC obituary of John Garang, who died in a plane crash shortly
afterward, describes him as having "varied from Marxism to drawing
support from Christian fundamentalists in the US." "There was always
confusion on central issues such as whether the Sudan People's
Liberation Army was fighting for independence for southern Sudan or
merely more autonomy. Friends and foes alike found the SPLA's human
rights record in southern Sudan and Mr Garang's style of governance
disturbing." Gill Lusk - deputy editor of Africa Confidential and a
Sudan specialist who interviewed the ex-guerrilla leader several times
over the years was quoted by BBC, "John Garang did not tolerate
dissent and anyone who disagreed with him was either imprisoned or
killed."
CIA use of tough guys like Garang in Sudan, Savimbi in Angola, Mobutu
in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), had been
reported, even in mass media, though certainly not featured or
criticized, but presently, this is of course buried away from public
awareness and meant to be forgotten, as commercial media focuses on
presenting the U.S. wars of today in a heroic light. It has
traditionally been the chore of progressive, alternate and independent
journalism to see that their deathly deeds supported by U.S. citizens
tax dollars are not forgotten, ultimately not accepted and past
Congresses and Presidents held responsible, even in retrospect, when
not in real time.
Oil and business interests remain paramount and although Sudan is on
the U.S. Government's state sponsors of terrorism list, the United
States alternately praises its cooperation in tracking suspect
individuals or scolds about the Janjaweed in Darfur. National Public
Radio on May 2, 2005 had Los Angeles Times writer Ken Silverstein talk
about his article "highlighting strong ties between the U.S. and
Sudanese intelligence services, despite the Bush administration's
criticism of human-rights violation in the Sudan." Title was "Sudan,
CIA Forge Close Ties, Despite Rights Abuses." Nicholas Kristof, of The
New York Times, won a 2006 Pulitzer Prize for "his having alerted this
nation and the world to these massive crimes against humanity. He made
six dangerous trips to Darfur to report names and faces of victims of
the genocide for which President Bush had long before indicted the
government of Sudan to the world's indifference." [Reuters] But last
November saw the opening of a new U.S. consulate in Juba the capital
of the Southern region. (Maybe consider this an example of "If you
can't beat 'em, join 'em!" especially where oil is involved.)
The point is there is human suffering at mammoth level proportions.
Humanitarian activists are trying to pry open the purse strings of an
administration and congress willing to spend billions upon billions to
get people killed and keep them in their place, namely, at our feet.
Reminding Congress of what needs to be atoned for because of past
policies of supporting war and human destruction could eventually make
present policies of war intolerable. Americans are presently not
exactly conscious stricken about dead and maimed Iraqis and Afghans,
for commercial media always keeps of most of the human particulars of
war crimes modestly out of sight, dramatizing much lesser losses and
suffering of American military personal abroad.
Darfur made the headlines again because a governor of presidential
timber was building up his foreign policy credentials. Meanwhile we
are going to continue to see newsreels of our mass media depressing us
with scenes of starving children, basically as testimony of how evil
another Islamic nation's government is, so we can feel good - and want
to purchase the products needing the advertising - which pays for the
entertainment/news programs - which keep viewers in the dark about
THEIR contribution to the suffering brought upon those people all the
way over there in Africa.
Just try to put 4 and 2 million of anything into perspective. We are
talking about an equivalent to the sets of eyes of half the population
of Manhattan. Imagine one of us, whether a precious child ,a handsome
man, a beautiful women, - to the tune of, (dirge of), one times four
million, half of us dead. Sorry! It has no impact right? We realize
that, remembering the words of Joseph Stalin (of all people), "One
man's death is a tragedy, a thousand, is a statistic." There is
absolutely no way we can whip up enough anguish to match a total of
four million displaced and two million dead Sudanese, unless we could
be of a mind and heart with Martin Luther King dealing with three
million dead Vietnamese, also as in this case, over on the other side
of the world, far from our living rooms - "So it is that those of us
who are yet determined that "America will be" are led down the path of
protest and dissent, working for the health of our land." (MLK, 1967,
"Beyond Vietnam")
This writer remembers reading newspapers articles about the U.S.
backing the Southern Sudan rebellion way back then. If we had
supported a side that wound up winning, we would be bragging about our
having supported 'freedom fighters'. But we just threw a lot of money
and outdated weapons at a John Garang in the Sudan, as we did with
Jonas Savimbi in Angola, to the ultimate destruction of millions of
people, and they LOST! Like we did in Vietnam, and half-way lost in
Korea, and now are mid-way losing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Jesus!
Calculating the chances of an investment in human life and money
coming to a fruition of sorts - that is certainly the job of any
intelligence gathering agency! What we have had is an Agency using its
gathered intelligence to do unintelligent things because, as our Ralph
Waldo Emerson wrote more than a hundred and twenty-five years ago,
"Things are in the saddle and ride herd over men" (trampling others
under foot, we might add)
The European Union is under pressure from inside to assure that a
United Nations force of 20,000 men will be sent to Darfur as required
by Security Council resolution 1706, and to threaten sanctions in
order to halt a war the U.S. was originally interested to see begun.
The U.N. Security Council will receive a list from the International
Criminal Court of those Sudanese officials who could be charged with
war crimes. The list is expected include some members of rebel
organizations among Sudanese government officials and Janjaweed
militias. There assuredly will be no names on the list of non-Sudanese
officials of nations which were known to have involved themselves in
this Sudanese civil war contrary to accepted provisions and
obligations of U.N. membership. But we can know that the
responsibility for war, slaughter, rape and theft in Sudan extends
beyond the leaders of those murderously wielding guns and swords.
It will be good if outside influence will now be focused on peace, but
citizens best be vigilant of their nation's foreign policy intentions.
The world has heard many protestations that oil is not a reason for
war, but blood and oil has been known to mix.
end of article-------------------
That now the U.S. use its economic power humanely, to promote peace in
the Sudan and give generously to help war victims.
Appreciatively in advance of possibly hearing something back on this
from the cutting edge African web site
in solidarity, Jay Janson
http://www.google.ca/gwt/x?gl=CA&hl=en-CA&u=http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php%3Farticle22901&q=State+Rules:+Oil+companies+and+armed+conflict+in+Sudan&sa=X&ei=KHEjU7-gCoj4yQGa9IDYCA&ved=0CCMQFjAA
--
SIBOMANA Jean Bosco
Google+: https://plus.google.com/110493390983174363421/posts
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http://www.youtube.com/user/sibomanaxyz999
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