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ROOM FOR DEBATE
How to Stabilize Congo
Congo has been poorly governed throughout its post-colonial history, and is chronically prone to violence. What is the secret to stabilizing the resource-rich country?
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Experts report that Rwanda is unequivocally involved in the destabilization of the DRC.
(Washington, D.C.) - Another report... another investigation... more women raped... more horrific deaths... more displaced people…more children starving. Welcome to the Democratic Republic of Congo.
It has been labeled the most dangerous place in the world to be a woman and has been the victim of a 15 year war waged by Rwanda that started as an alleged hunt for people accused of committing genocide to now being a war for minerals, power and money.
The DRC is one of the largest countries on the African continent and holds resources beyond minerals and wealth; the land could feed the entire continent if allowed and the water resources could provide electricity far beyond its borders. Yet, this natural wonder remains a war zone and much of her residents traumatized beyond what any human on earth should ever experience. Although through all this the strength and determination of the Congolese people is unmatched.
The residents of Goma have gone a weeks without power or water. Food resources are very low and many are starving from hunger and thirst. The city is overrun with rebels back by the Rwandan Government who call themselves the M23. They have looted the city of it resources including banks, food and personal property.
The fighting has caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people who have fled to neighboring areas in order to stay alive. No person anywhere should have to live this way and no child should ever have to know what it is like to live in a war zone.
Report after report have all stated the same facts. Credible agencies like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Oxfam and the Group of Experts to the United Nations Security Council have all reported that Rwanda is supplying weapons, directives, communication equipment and soldiers to the M23 rebel group that is currently terrorizing eastern DRC.
The latest Group of Experts report to the UNSC increased their verification methods with the accusations in the latest report on the situation in the DRC stating that Rwanda is unequivocally involved in the destabilization of the DRC. Yet with all of these reports nothing is being done. Nothing. The ICGLR, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, met last week without the presence of President Paul Kagame of Rwanda in order to find a regional solution to the ongoing crisis in the DRC. Yet, the main members, Uganda and Rwanda, both stand accused of aiding and abetting war crimes in the DRC as well as in their own country. How can the countries currently destabilizing the region be trusted to find a solution?
The latest report that has not been as widely reported on as it should be is the most recent Oxfam report entitled Commodities of War (http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/commodities-war-drc).
Reading this report should anger any reader and urge them to take action. This reports clearly states how betrayed the people of the eastern DRC are and who is behind the atrocious acts being committed. The DRC military, FARDC, are not visible and are not protecting the people of Goma and the surrounding areas as there are required to do.
The local police, PDC, who are also in place to protect the citizens, are causing instability and corruption on a daily basis. The Oxfam report states that the local police will not even begin to investigate crimes or even assist victims until they have been paid a requested sum of money. In most places this behavior is called corruption.
The UN Group of Experts has provided unequivocal and detailed proof that no rational mind can refute yet the UNSC refuses to hold Rwanda responsible for their part in destabilizing the DRC. In a cursory move the UNSC placed sanctions on a leader of the M23 limiting his travel and freezing assets yet these sanctions will have no effect on stabilizing the region. For example this leader, Sultan Makanga, traveled to Uganda last week to meet with President Museveni for talks on the situation in Goma. So much for that travel ban!
The UNSC has met and "condemned" the actions of the M23 but what exactly does that do to support the people of the DRC? A verbal warning is worth nothing when a community has no water, no power and is starving.
MONUSCO troops are also on the ground in one of the world's largest contingent of peacekeeping members from the UN but the Oxfam report is very clear that MONUSCO is not protecting the citizens as they have been commissioned.
Further and most devastating is the fact that the people of the DRC have been betrayed by their President, Joseph Kabila. President Kabila has a duty to direct the army, to protect the citizens and to rise up against those who seek to destroy his country and he has done none of that.
He has turned his back on his people in order to appease the powers around him; namely Paul Kagame of Rwanda who installed Kabila as president after ordering the assassination of his father Laurent Kabila in 2001.
These bed-fellows have wreaked havoc on the DRC with over 5 million people killed. At what point does this war become severe enough to warrant major media attention? How many innocent lives have to be lost in order for the international community to take notice and act?
This last week the UK made their decision to suspend the aid that was due to be dispersed to Rwanda in December. A payment of over $33 million USD will not be released to Rwanda due to their direct involvement in aiding and abetting the M23 in Congo. Many nations have already cut their aid and the UK and US are the last two to make their decisions.
As of press time of this article the US has finally made a decision to impose sanctions on those who are supporting the M23 and have named Rwanda specifically in their report.
THE Democratic Republic of Congo, which erupted in violence again earlier this month, ought to be one of the richest countries in the world. Its immense mineral reserves are currently valued by some estimates at more than $24 trillion and include 30 percent of the world's diamond reserves; vast amounts of cobalt, copper and gold; and 70 percent of the world's coltan, which is used in electronic devices. Yet the most recent edition of the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index ranked Congo last among the 187 countries and territories included in the survey.
Congo has been poorly governed throughout its post-colonial history, and is chronically prone to violence. What is the secret to stabilizing the resource-rich country?
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Instead of prosperity, Congo's mineral wealth has brought only an endless procession of unscrupulous rulers eager to exploit its riches, from King Leopold II of Belgium to Mobutu Sese Seko, who was allowed by the logic of the cold war to rule the same area as a private fief. And last year, the current president, Joseph Kabila, who inherited the job from his assassinated father more than a decade ago, awarded himself another five-year term in elections that were criticized by everyone from the European Union to the country's Roman Catholic bishops.
If some enterprises, public or private, can be said to be "too big to fail," Congo is the reverse: it is too big to succeed. It is an artificial entity whose constituent parts share the misfortune of having been seized by the explorer Henry Morton Stanley in the name of a rapacious 19th-century Belgian monarch. From the moment Congo was given independence in 1960, it was being torn apart by centrifugal forces, beginning with separatism in the mineral-rich southern province of Katanga.
The international community has repeatedly dodged this reality by opting for so-called peace deals with shelf lives barely longer than the news cycle. Rather than nation-building, what is needed to end Congo's violence is the opposite: breaking up a chronically failed state into smaller organic units whose members share broad agreement or at least have common interests in personal and community security.
In recent weeks, a rebel group calling itself the March 23 Movement, or M23, has stormed through eastern Congo, scattering poorly trained units loyal to the government and reducing a huge United Nationspeacekeeping force to a helpless bystander as M23 seized control of Goma, the capital of the resource-rich North Kivu province. The rebel advance rekindled fears of a renewal of the bloody 1998-2003 Second Congo War, which drew the armies of a host of African countries as well as countless local militias into what was aptly dubbed "Africa's world war."
The M23 rebels appear indistinguishable from the several dozen other armed groups lurking in or around Congo, but in many respects they are quite different. Many M23 members are veterans of an earlier insurgent group, the National Congress for the Defense of the People, known by the French acronym C.N.D.P., which consisted largely of ethnic Tutsi Congolese who had banded together to fight the former Hutu génocidaires who fled to Congo following the end of their killing spree in Rwanda in 1994.
In a peace deal that was reached nearly four years ago, the Kabila government promised to facilitate the return of more than 50,000 Congolese Tutsi refugees, to integrate C.N.D.P. fighters into the national army, and to share power with the group's leaders. Mr. Kabila's failure to honor these commitments led to the current M23 revolt.
A United Nations report has accused the Rwandan government of supporting M23. Although Rwanda has denied it, this may well be true, and it is perfectly understandable given that the M23 rebels are fighting former Hutu génocidaires who still dream of invading Rwanda and finishing what they started nearly two decades ago.
Others have dismissed the M23 leaders as "warlords." But warlords, even if they do not acquire power through democratic means, tend to provide some sort of political framework, often based on kinship ties or ethnic solidarity, that is seen as legitimate. They also tend to provide some basic security — which is more than the questionably legitimate Kabila government in Kinshasa provides for most Congolese.
Whatever else Congo's various armed groups may be, they are clearly viewed by large segments of some communities as de facto protectors — a point underscored by the several hundred government soldiers and police officers who recently defected to M23 and publicly swore allegiance to it after the fall of Goma.
If Congo were permitted to break up into smaller entities, the international community could devote its increasingly scarce resources to humanitarian relief and development, rather than trying, as the United Nations Security Council has pledged, to preserve the "sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity" of a fictional state that is of value only to the political elites who have clawed their way to the top in order to plunder Congo's resources and fund the patronage networks that ensure that they will remain in power.
Despite its democratic misnomer, Mr. Kabila has repeatedly delayed holding local elections since 2005. For years, every last mayor, burgomeister and neighborhood chief in the entire country has been appointed by presidential decree.
Given the dysfunctional status quo and the terrible toll it has exacted in terms of lives and resources, the West should put aside ideological dogmatism in favor of statesmanlike pragmatism and acknowledge the reality that, at least in some extreme cases, the best way to break a cycle of violence is to break up an artificial country in crisis and give it back to its very real people.
J. Peter Pham is director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council.
On November 14, President Obama vigorously defended U.N. ambassador Susan Rice during a press conference in the White House's Rose Garden, perhaps signaling that he was unworried by the possibility of a drawn-out battle with Republicans looking to block Rice's possible nomination as secretary of state. Rice, who has been criticized for her promoting a now-disproven explanation for the deadly attack on an American diplomatic facility in Benghazi, Libya, apparently has the full support of the president that could nominate her for the highest diplomatic position in the land.
Things are not quite as amicable at U.N. headquarters. As the conflict in the Eastern DRC escalated, and as two U.N. reports provided extensive evidence of official Rwandan and Ugandan support for the M23 rebel group, Rice's delegation blocked any mention of the conflict's most important state actors in a Security Council statement. And in June, the U.S. attempted to delay the release of a UN Group of Experts report alleging ties between Rwanda and M23.
Peter Rosenblum, a respected human rights lawyer and professor at Columbia Law School, says that the U.S.'s reticence in singling out state actors is significant, especially at the U.N. "It shows [Rice] is willing to expend political capital to cast something of a shield over Rwanda and Uganda," he says. "These are the things that in diplomatic settings, they are remarked upon. People see that the U.S. is still there defending the leaders of these countries at a time when many of their other closest allies have just grown sort of increasingly weary and dismayed."
Sarah Margon of Human Rights Watch agrees that the U.S. should be more active in naming potential obstacles in resolving the eastern DRC conflict. "It's unacceptable for Rwanda to be violating UN Security Council resolutions and meddling in international peace and security," she says. "I think the U.S. government has a very powerful voice and they need to use it."
For some, Rice embodies a period in American policy in which U.S. influence was not put to particularly effective use in Africa. Rice served as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during Bill Clinton's second term as president. As Rosenblum explained in a 2002 article in Current History [$], the second Clinton administration began with a full-fledged pivot to Africa, with Madeline Albright undertaking a high-profile visit to the continent early in her tenure as secretary of state. It was a substantive trip -- Albright gathered some of Africa's most dynamic newly-installed heads of state in Entebbe and Addis Ababa, where she articulated America's intention to change its relationship with the continent.
But Rosenblum explains that this approach meant embracing now-problematic leaders like Rwanda's Paul Kagame, Ethiopia's Meles Zenawi, Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, and, to a lesser extent, DRC's Laurent Kabila and Eritrea's Isais Afewerki. Under Clinton's Africa policy, these leaders -- all of whom were former rebels who had taken power through violent means -- would serve as a vanguard for the social and political transformation of the continent. Above all, they would be treated as normal allies of the United States, regarded as equal partners and autonomous actors, rather than countries that were only important insomuch as they could be exploited or ignored. Redefining and strengthening Washington's relationship to Africa was a laudable aim that arguably presaged the much greater degree of engagement that followed under George W. Bush and Obama.
Yet Rosenblum believes Rice helped usher in a policy that counted very few successes, even if he says that he has been "very impressed" with her tenure as UN ambassador. "Rice was a major force in this new, very personalized engagement with a group of leaders who had come to power through military means but who represented, for the Clinton policy people, something new and admirable," he says. "The group they bonded to included leaders who were eventually at war with each other within a period of two or three years." By the end of Clinton's presidency, Afewerki and Zenawi had fought a war that killed between 70,000 and 100,000 people; Kagame and Museveni fought Kabila in the eastern DRC, and then turned their guns on each other. Many, including the author and former U.N. investigator Jason Stearns, believe that Clinton's policy enabled both Rwandan and Ugandan adventurism in Eastern Congo, prolonging a conflict that still reverberates.
Perhaps more jarring is this anecdote in an essay by Howard French in the New York Review of Books that directly relates to Rice:
In allowing the Rwandan invasion of Zaire, the United States had two very different goals. The most immediate was the clearing of over one million Hutu refugees from U.N. camps near the Rwandan border, which had become bases for vengeful elements of the defeated Hutu army and Interahamwe militia, the agents of the Rwandan genocide. In [Gerard] Prunier's telling:"When Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice came back from her first trip to the Great Lakes region [of East Africa], a member of her staff said, 'Museveni [of Uganda] and Kagame agree that the basic problem in the Great Lakes is the danger of a resurgence of genocide and they know how to deal with that. The only thing we [i.e., the U.S.] have to do is look the other way.'"
The gist of Prunier's anecdote is correct, except that participants have confirmed to me that it was Rice herself who spoke these words.
Was this actually a reflection of policy -- did the U.S. really expect nothing of their allies on the human rights front? This is debatable, but it is clear that the U.S. considered many of the biggest problems in the region to emanate from Kinshasa. Jendayi Frazer, who held the assistant secretary for African affairs position during George W. Bush's second term and is now a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, notes that "the Clinton administration had become very antagonistic with the Congolese government -- for many good reasons, but nevertheless, they had become very antagonistic."
Laurent Kabila, whom the Clinton administration had pressured in response to massacres of Hutu refugees in the eastern Congo in the years after the 1994 Rwandan genocide, was assassinated just days before George W. Bush's inauguration in 2001. Frazer says that the Bush administration used the elevation of his son Joseph to the presidency as an opening for pursuing a regional peace agreement, which was eventually signed in 2003. Because of the change in leadership, "we were able to position ourselves in a more neutral fashion vis-a-vis Congo and Rwanda and Uganda and not be painted as being on one side or another," she said. She emphasized that this is not intended as a criticism of Clinton's policy, and adds that there is nothing in Rice's record that she considers disqualifying for secretary of state.
Frazer was, however, critical of the Obama administration's current approach in Central Africa. She says the U.S. could have pushed for MONUSCO, the U.N. peacekeeping force based in the eastern DRC, to take a more active role in the conflict, or it could have taken the lead on figuring out how or whether a multinational force agreed to by regional governments in July would be deployed. "I think the Obama team has been anemic in its Africa policy," she said. "And that is also expressed in the DRC and the Great Lakes region. They basically haven't been present. They haven't shaped events to the point where these problems that they're seeing today wouldn't be there."
Frazer notes that Rice hasn't even been officially nominated yet. Because Obama has strongly implied that she might be nominated without officially committing to her as his choice for the next secretary of state, Rice's candidacy has been debated among partisans and pundits rather than by the members of the Senate who have to confirm her. "Susan Rice finds herself getting vetted in public in the worst way," Frazer says, "without even the benefit of a nomination."
The past four years of American policy in Africa, and the larger tendency toward trusting, cooperating with, and even shielding troublesome governments, cannot be pinned on Rice alone. And Clinton, Albright and Rice were merely pursuing a policy that made sense at the time, and that might still make sense today. Since the outbreak of the conflict in the mid-1990s, American policymakers have assumed that it was impossible to make peace in the eastern Congo without the cooperation of Museveni and Kagame, especially given both Uganda and Rwanda's legitimate national security interests in the region (a heroes-and-villains-type dichotomy in a conflict as complex as the eastern DRC's would be counterproductive in any event). Frazer rejects the idea that Clinton should not have closely engaged with these governments. "I think the Clinton administration tried to structure regional approaches to address the peace and security challenges in Africa," she said. "There are times where it advances things, and there are times where it doesn't advance things as much as we like."
The real-world results of any policy are inherently unknowable, especially in a situation as dizzying as the eastern DRC in the late 1990s. This uncertainty should hardly exempt policymakers from accountability, and according to Rosenblum's article, it was unclear whether Rice really understood the consequences of the U.S.'s close relationship with Kagame, or the impact of running interference for a government that might have been working against regional stability and peace:
On September 15 [1998], Susan Rice addressed the growing perception of complicity in testimony before the Congress. "Mr. Chairman, let me be clear: the United States in no way supported, encouraged, or condoned the intervention of Rwandan or Ugandan forces in the Congo, as some have suggested. This is a specious and ridiculous accusation that I want to lay to rest once and for all." But these statements did little good. Nearly four years later, an official in the new Colin Powell State Department told me, the United States had gotten to the point where the French 'no longer believe that the United States is funding the war.' But that was about it.
Has anything changed since the early days of the 1998 crisis? Back then, Rosenblum notes, "The official State Department statements ... show[ed] a new concern for human rights problems in Congo balanced against tepid anti-war language." Today, the weeks since the escalation of the M23 crisis have played out in an eerily similar fashion. On November 20 and 21, 2012, State Department spokespeople wove their way through questions about Rwanda's role in the M23 crisis, and made an apparently conscious effort to avoid singling out Kagame's government. And there's the Security Council statement on the escalating crisis, which obliquely calls for "an end to any and all outside support" without sayingwhose support, exactly.
In 1998, the U.S. government believed it could use its existing close relations with Kagame's government to push for a negotiated solution. There was none to be had for another three years, and that was only after the leadership of the United States and the Congo had changed. Despite the failure of this strategy, this seems to be the Obama administration's plan of action today. The wars are broadly similar. The U.S. policy approach to ending them is similar. And at least one of the people at heart of American diplomacy in Africa is the same -- a gifted and respected diplomat who might be the U.S.'s next secretary of state.
-“The root cause of the Rwandan tragedy of 1994 is the long and past historical ethnic dominance of one minority ethnic group to the other majority ethnic group. Ignoring this reality is giving a black cheque for the Rwandan people’s future and deepening resentment, hostility and hatred between the two groups.”
-« Ce dont j’ai le plus peur, c’est des gens qui croient que, du jour au lendemain, on peut prendre une société, lui tordre le cou et en faire une autre ».
-“The hate of men will pass, and dictators die, and the power they took from the people will return to the people. And so long as men die, liberty will never perish.”
-“I have loved justice and hated iniquity: therefore I die in exile.”
-“The price good men pay for indifference to public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.”