Pages

Monday, 13 May 2024

[Rwanda Forum] The Virtue of Lying? Unmasking the Truth About the Rwandan Genocide


The Virtue of Lying? Unmasking the Truth About the Rwandan Genocide

Michela Wrong on Obfuscation and the Impact of Polarizing Narratives


March 30, 2021

Throughout the writing of my book about the murder of Patrick Karegeya, I kept thinking about the Epimenides paradox. The one that runs: "'All Cretans are liars,' says Epimenides, the Cretan." It came to mind because Rwandans kept telling me that deceiving others, being economical with the truth, was something their community reveled in, positively prided itself upon.

Especially when dealing with Western outsiders. A proof of superiority, not shame, when successfully achieved. So much so, that the practice had worked itself into the language. Naïf comme les blancs (Naive as the white folk), Rwandans will say of someone, in the same way that other cultures will say "as thick as two short planks," or "as dumb as a post."

One of Rwanda's prime ministers, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, shocked the head of a UN peacekeeping force by telling him: "Rwandans are liars and it is a part of their culture. From childhood they are taught to not tell the truth, especially if it can hurt them." She was one of the first victims of the 1994 genocide, murdered by interahamwe thugs.

A successor told me the same thing over coffee in a Brussels hotel lobby many years later: "In Rwanda, lying is an art form. When you, as a white journalist, leave a meeting, they will be congratulating themselves: 'We took her for a ride.' Lying is the rule, rather than the exception."

It was an accusation tossed into conversations with Tutsis and Hutus, Rwandans and Ugandans, diplomats and military men, lawyers, and journalists. "You spoke to so-and-so? Oh, he's the most terrible liar."

It was not, it seemed, a recent practice. Dip into the history and you quickly stumble upon gleeful deceits. One is the story of German explorer and naturalist Dr. Richard Kandt, who arrived at the gates of the Rwandan royal court in 1898. When Dr. Kandt asked to see the Mwami, King Yuhi Musinga, the courtiers did what they always did when presumptuous white men ventured into this land of misty volcanos and rolling green hills: they presented him with a kinsman and awaited his reaction, laughing among themselves at the German's anticipated stupidity.

Dr. Kandt, however, had not only bothered to learn the local language, he had done some research. He knew that the Mwami was a teenager. Expressions changed as he shifted into Kinyarwanda, pointing out that this fully grown "Mwami" must be a fake and asking to see the real king. His eventual reward was to be made Resident in Rwanda, a mediator between the Rwandan Tutsi court and a renascent Germany hungry for an African empire. His house in Kigali is now a national museum, a fitting tribute to one of the first westerners to beat a Rwandan at his own game.

English adventurer Ewart Grogan, a contemporary of Kandt's, after an 1899 trip to "Ruanda-Urundi," as it was then known, railed bitterly against the mendacity of local guides, who would deny the existence of a mountain, he claimed, even when it virtually stared him in the face. "Lies, lies, lies, I was sick to death of them," he wrote. "Of all the liars in Africa, I believe the people of Ruanda are by far the most thorough."

It's not surprising, perhaps, that historically, dissimulation and secrecy became prized in an incestuous court beset with intrigue, where nobles lived in constant fear for their lives. Ritualists relayed messages from a Supreme Being only they could decipher, earthly power rested with a Queen Mother who sat invisible behind a screen, and the aristocracy exerted feudal dominion over the peasantry, obliging each hamlet to spy on its own inhabitants and report back to the throne.

Around the personage of the Mwami, who was never publicly seen to eat or drink, swirled a haze of euphemistic terminology. "The King is seated" indicated he was performing bodily functions; "The King has given his person" was the closest a courtier came to indicating the Mwami might have died. To be elliptical, layered, intellectually opaque—these were signs of good breeding. The crudeness of direct speech was reserved for peasants.

Kinyarwanda itself is a language infused with subtle wisps of meaning, hidden references its intended audience immediately picks up but foreigners miss. "Oh, if only you spoke Kinyarwanda you'd understand, it's as clear as day," a Rwandan will often exclaim in frustration, after translating a politician's content-packed speech, which, when converted into English, appears, disappointingly, to say nothing terribly significant. To the Rwandan's ears, the threats are direct, the promises crystal clear.

Kinyarwanda itself is a language infused with subtle wisps of meaning.

Look up the word ubwenge in a Kinyarwanda dictionary and the translation reads "wisdom," or "sense." But it can also be translated as "cunning," "deception," a quality Rwandan children are encouraged to develop, seen as the ultimate sign of maturity. It goes hand in hand with the concept of intwari, which French historian Gérard Prunier defines as "the quality of impassivity, aloofness, being beyond and above events, implacable."

Intwari was expected of young Tutsi boys destined to become warriors. Dignity before spontaneity: "In this respect," adds Prunier, "the culture the Rwandans most resemble are the Japanese." But what he is describing also echoes the "stiff upper lip" made famous by English aristocrats, a characteristic associated in both countries with an upper class groomed from birth for leadership and military service in defense of the nation.

As a Rwandan psychologist once told me: "To show emotional reserve is considered a sign of high standing. You do not just pour out your heart in Rwanda. You do not cry. It's the opposite of Western oversharing, a form of stoicism."

A culture that glories in its impenetrability, that sees virtue in misleading: to someone proposing to write a nonfiction account embracing many of the most controversial episodes in Rwandan history, it posed a bit of a challenge.

Two deadly secrets squat at the base of Rwanda's modern history: the circumstances in which the charismatic commander of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) met his end in 1990; and the question of who shot down the plane carrying the Rwandan president and his Burundian counterpart, a double presidential assassination that set the 1994 genocide in motion. Few contemporary histories are so thoroughly contested. With the passage of the years, a variety of analysts, commissions of inquiry, and investigating magistrates have changed their minds on key points, angrily contradicted one another, or simply given up on the attempt to establish the truth, opting for a bland: "No one will ever know."

The conflicting narratives would be understandable if the events in question dated back thousands of years. The fact that they concern episodes that took place in the last quarter of a century, involving players often still available for interview, highlights the problem posed by the calculated unreliability of key witnesses.

When it came to embroidering the truth, Patrick Karegeya, Rwanda's former head of external intelligence, knew more than most. During one of our most intriguing conversations, he explained some of the characteristics of the political lie. We'd been talking about Muammar Gaddafi, whom Patrick (almost everyone referred to him by his first name) had met several times. For decades, African rebel groups routinely turned to the Libyan leader for arms and funding—and he often obliged. Like many despots, Patrick said, Gaddafi possessed an elephantine memory for faces and names. "He was like a library, he knew everything about Africa, about every African leader. He was not good at analysis, but he knew everything about everyone."

I mentioned that both Mobutu Sese Seko and Haile Selassie possessed similar memories: contemporaries and biographers remarked upon it. What explained that prodigious retention of detail?

"Because he had evil intentions," was Patrick's simple answer. "When you are lying, you focus on the lie you are telling, because you know you need to remember it when you next meet that person. You remember the encounter, because you were lying all that time. Whereas if I try in a year's time to remember this coffee with you, I won't be able to recall when exactly it took place or what we said or did. Because I was just being myself." Deceit, if it is to be sustained, requires focus.

It was said with rueful self-knowledge. In his latter years, Patrick—like many of those interviewed for my book about his murder—was trying to undo a knot of his own tying. He and his closest colleagues in the RPF were responsible for a compelling narrative peddled to journalists, diplomats, human rights workers, Western officials, and ordinary Rwandans throughout the 1990s and aughts. They had sold that story with passionate energy, driving aggression, and a sophisticated understanding of their respective audiences' guilt complexes and pressure points.

These were men supremely skilled at seduction, intellectual, emotional, or sexual. American diplomats weary of negotiating with sleazy Great Lakes politicians thrilled at the puritanism of these thin, driven young men in camouflage. NGO workers who were new to Africa's Great Lakes listened to their tales, hearts pounding with sympathy and outrage—initially, at least. Reporters, photographers, and filmmakers became lifelong friends or ended up jumping into bed with them. Intensity, along with imminent danger—and the Great Lakes has always been a dangerous place to live and work—is one of the great aphrodisiacs.

These were men supremely skilled at seduction, intellectual, emotional, or sexual.

One journalist I know, working for a mainstream news agency, covertly joined the RPF's intelligence payroll; another confessed, many years later, to carrying a top-secret message for the movement to a Congolese minister in Kinshasa: the conflict of interest this represented never crossed his mind. After the genocide, Rwanda could so easily be viewed through the prism of the Holocaust and the pledge of "Never Again." And to the Anglo-Saxon world, at least, it seemed clear who the Good Guys were: the insurgent RPF.

It was a storyline that required careful curation by officials like Patrick, and the history of the period is littered with deliberately leaked memos, suppressed reports, and many a daring forgery. The men I spoke to went on to challenge and undermine the account, only to discover—irony of ironies—that they had done their original work rather too well. Having superbly marketed the narrative of the underdog turned moral crusader returning home, they found, when they tried denouncing it, that their listeners preferred the lie to its teller. When Cretan Epimenides tells you not to believe the Cretans, why would a sane person listen?

The debate over the Rwandan narrative has always been polarized between those—often Francophones—who saw the RPF as invaders willing to sacrifice millions in their ruthless quest to return Tutsis to power in Rwanda, and those—usually Anglophones—who saw them as warrior-liberators who, tracing a giant geographical and historical boomerang, overturned one of Africa's most evil regimes.

The level of hatred and contempt felt by each side for the other is astonishing. Perhaps only the Israel-Palestine debate can equal it for venom. The vitriol is in part explained by the stakes involved, the extraordinary amount of blood shed at every stage. Who can contemplate all those hundreds of thousands of dead—not just in Rwanda, but in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—and remain coolheaded?

As Paul Kagame gradually emerged as one of Africa's uncontestable autocrats, damning evidence kept surfacing of RPF atrocities. At first it could be brushed aside, using the classic justifications of realpolitik: Rwanda was situated in a rough neighborhood, the argument went; its government, trying to restore peace and security to a traumatized society, could not be held to the standards of Sweden or Switzerland.

Then the movement that had seemed to outsiders so united began splintering, and key members quit and ran. The RPF's self-imposed oath of Omertà, rigidly observed up till then, began to crack, and as it did so, people like me who had seen the RPF as implacable, certainly, but a disciplined, highly effective movement with a farsighted leadership and a progressive agenda, felt our certainties begin to tremble.

As examples of RPF human rights abuses and unaccountability accumulated, I was not the only previously supportive journalist who winced, frowned, and was quietly grateful to be writing about other things. My career had taken me elsewhere, Rwanda was no longer my beat. Still, it was painful to accept that I might have unwittingly misled my readers.

When Cretan Epimenides tells you not to believe the Cretans, why would a sane person listen?

On the few occasions when I met up with Patrick Karegeya during these years, I avoided asking him certain questions. Of course, I kick myself for that now. I told myself it was out of politeness. Reminding an exiled spy chief that he had once told the media the exact opposite of what he was now saying seemed, well, rude. The guy was down on his luck, beleaguered in every sense of the word, why rub salt into his wounds? But my concern was also for myself: I didn't want to confront the truth of just how thoroughly I might have got it wrong.

Political philosopher Frantz Fanon captured that disinclination perfectly: "Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn't fit in with the core belief."

The greater the effort that goes into forming a belief, the more reluctant those who hold it are to adjust their lenses. The investment a shamefaced outside world poured into Rwanda after the genocide—financial, emotional, intellectual—was enormous, given the country's tiny size and population. No wonder so many are reluctant to reassess.

What I discovered, however, was that whatever the conscious mind decides to engage with—or bypass—one's cognitive process continues to churn heedlessly along in the background. There came a day when, with a near-audible mental ping, I realized I no longer believed most of the key "truths" upon which the RPF had built its account, and hadn't for ages. It felt like a relief. Shibboleths can weigh heavy on the soul.

One thing I never doubted, not for a second, was that a genocide had occurred in Rwanda in April 1994. I'd seen the bodies, gagged at the unmistakable aroma that comes off a hurriedly buried mass grave, registered the bloody handprints left on the walls of classrooms and church buildings by Tutsi men, women, and children scrabbling to escape their executioners. Images of that kind are hard to forget.

What I no longer believed was the RPF's explanation of how the country had come to reach that terrible point, or the movement's depiction of itself as not just a morally blameless actor during the buildup to that episode, but the rebel equivalent of a knight in shining armor, cantering in to lance the dragon of ethnic slaughter.


https://lithub.com/the-virtue-of-lyng-unmasking-the-truth-about-the-rwandan-genocide/

_________________________

--
________________________________________________________________
-Ushobora kohereza message yawe kuri : rwandaforum@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwiyandikisha kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+subscribe@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwikura kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
-Contact: rwandaforumonline@gmail.com
____________________________________________________
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rwanda Forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/rwandaforum/CAEe4F%3Dc0qPrewLXTaNhOHv6v4tt9cRBdayuCtaHZ1YCXk4Y15g%40mail.gmail.com.

[Rwanda Forum] The truth about the Rwandan genocide 7 April 2024, 6:00am

The truth about the Rwandan genocide

  • 7 April 2024, 6:00am
Rwandan president Paul Kagame light the flame of remembrance during last year's genocide commemoration (Credit: Getty images)

Today a solemn ceremony takes place in Rwanda's capital. President Paul Kagame, flanked by international dignitaries – including our own development secretary Andrew Mitchell – will light a flame of remembrance at Kigali's genocide memorial, where the bones of more than 250,000 people are interred.

'Kwibuka' ('Remember' in Kinyarwanda) – this act of commemoration – happens every April. But this time it's special. It has now been 30 years since the genocide, and is thus an opportunity to assess the tenure of one of Africa's most controversial leaders. Cue a flood of pre-prepared broadcasts, articles and declarations from journalists, politicians and institutions.

The problem is not what the memorial shows, but what it omits

Many will contain a reference to the genocide memorial. Rightly so. The brainchild of James and Stephen Smith – two brothers from the north of England who set up the Aegis Trust, a British charity dedicated to preventing genocide – it's a remarkable site. Almost every tourist who goes there emerges shaken and deeply moved. Every potential investor, diplomat and foreign official – especially those trying to negotiate peace between Rwanda and the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – is obliged to make a stop.

I've visited several times over the years and have watched it change. At first its displays were gulp-inducingly graphic: shattered skulls, clothing stained with browning blood. Later, they became less in-your-face. Some of the Rwandan staff had visited Yad Vashem, Israel's official Holocaust memorial site, and clearly picked up tips there on how to make the displays simultaneously less gruesome and more poignant.

There's a commendable determination to remember the slaughtered men, women and children as individuals, rather than anonymous numbers. 'The last display is a children's room, with photos of the children who died,' a recently-returned friend told me. 'It's incredibly powerful. I came out with tears streaming down my face.'

I used to be a fan, but no longer. For the Smith brothers' well-intentioned project has become part and parcel of Rwanda's problem, it seems to me. It has served to airbrush an inconvenient history, cementing in place a government narrative which actively undermines Rwanda's professed commitment to reconciling majority Hutus and minority Tutsis.

The problem is not what the memorial shows, but what it omits. Quite correctly, it remembers the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis who were macheted, shot and clubbed to death by Hutu extremist militias and army soldiers in schools, churches and at checkpoints after President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane was shot out of the sky on 6 April 1994.

But that's only part of Rwanda's story, and there's the rub. Little time at the memorial is wasted on the build-up to the genocide, when Kagame's Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda and swept south, ethnically cleansing the population as it moved.

Predictably, there's no mention of the Kibeho massacre of 1995, when Kagame's troops shot dead around 8,000 displaced Hutus under the eyes of UN peacekeepers. The slaughter in 1996 and 1997 of tens of thousands of Hutu refugees who had fled into the DRC – massacres carefully documented by the UN – don't feature, either.

Kagame needs relations between Hutus and Tutsis to remain toxic, poisoned by mutual suspicion

Staff would no doubt argue that these things happened after the memorial's chosen cut-off point. But the glossing over of Rwanda's civil war means the genocide appears to come out of nowhere, a bolt from the blue. Context is all, and here context is missing.

These are taboo topics in modern Rwanda, where Kagame, who has been in power since 2000, always posits himself as 'the man who stopped the killing'. After Hutu opposition leader Victoire Ingabirereturning from exile, drew attention to this lacuna in 2010, she was rewarded with eight years in jail for terrorism and 'genocide denial'. She is now barred from running in this year's elections, making them a shoo-in for Kagame.

Ingabire is not the only person jailed for insisting that the RPF, too, has blood on its hands. As Human Rights Watch documents, Rwanda's prisons are full of poets, bloggers, citizen journalists and academics whose mistake was to publicly raise the issue of RPF past crimes.

Most of these detainees are Hutus, but, surreally, 'genocide denial' is also an accusation made against Tutsis who lost family members during the slaughter. One tragic example was Kizito Mihigo, a gospel singer known as 'the Dove'. He was jailed after questioning the official narrative and talking to exiled opposition party members. Amnestied, he was rearrested while trying to flee the country and died in a police cell in 2020. I don't know many Rwandans who believe he committed suicide – the official version given by the authorities.

These are individual examples, but they take place against a wider backdrop of ethnically-skewed blame and punishment. After the genocide, when its prisons were crammed to bursting point with suspected killers, Rwanda experimented with a form of grassroots justice called 'Gacaca', in which villagers tried and sentenced their neighbours. It was a practical way of dealing with an intractable problem. While Gacaca dealt with perpetrators low down in the administrative and army echelons, an international tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, simultaneously tried Habyarimana's top militia commanders, government officials and generals, the men who ordered the killings.

But this, too, has not been even-handed. Crimes committed by RPF officers and soldiers barely featured during Gacaca. The same went for the Arusha tribunal process. In both cases, those prosecuted were overwhelmingly Hutus.

Justice in post-conflict societies is always a rough and ready affair. In Europe after the Second World War, former Resistance fighters often found themselves living next door to Fascist collaborators who had either got off scot free or served the lightest of sentences. While Hitler's henchmen were hanged at Nuremberg, Churchill never had to answer for the bombing of Dresden.

Yet justice biased in the victor's favour is not just repugnant, but positively risky when the community being told it bears collective responsibility for one of the 20th century's worst atrocities, and has its nose constantly rubbed into past crimes in myriad small and petty ways, represents the majority.

This raises the question of whether what Kagame is doing is a clumsy miscalculation, a minority-pleasing blunder, or, in fact, entirely deliberate. Whatever he says when addressing a Western public – and Kagame's message always varies dramatically depending on whether he is speaking English or Kinyarwanda – I believe he needs relations between Hutus and Tutsis to remain toxic, poisoned by mutual suspicion, because that's the foundation on which his rule is premised. If you listen to his speeches and those of his nearest colleagues – particularly those of the pugnacious former defence minister James Kabarebe – you notice how enthusiastically they talk up the 'genocidal forces' raging in DRC, in Hutu refugee camps scattered across southern Africa, and even – supposedly – in Europe.

Rwanda's army is so well trained and armed it is regularly relied on by the West to send peacekeepers to places like Darfur, Central African Republic and Mozambique. Yet if you listen to Rwanda's leadership, you would think it could be toppled at any moment by the FDLR, a militia of ageing genocidaires operating across the border. Analysts estimate that force at just 600 men.

Kagame's support for a Tutsi rebel group – the M23 – laying waste to eastern DRC in recent years hardly sends out a message of ethnic reconciliation, either. The hatred against Congolese Tutsis that he decries is of his own making. As he well knows, nothing polarizes public sentiment like an armed invasion.

Years ago, key members of Rwanda's Tutsi elite – men who have known Kagame since he was a geeky young rebel – decided he had betrayed their movement's founding principles and clung to power far too long. Those dissident Tutsi voices were systematically silenced, with the men concerned either jailed, driven into exile or assassinated abroad.

Having sidelined his former brothers in arms, Kagame can present the contest in Rwanda not as a quarrel over which a member of a Tutsi elite gets to hold ultimate executive power, but as an existential struggle by a beleaguered ethnic minority over which only he can extend a shining, protective shield. By constantly telling his audience they are surrounded by enemies desperate to complete unfinished business, he underlines his own indispensability: 'You may not like me,' reads the message put out by every Rwandan newspaper, radio station and that poignant genocide memorial. 'But I'm the only thing between you and Armageddon.'

As a recipe for presidential survival, it makes sense. As a recipe for domestic and regional stability and peace, it's a disaster.

The Aegis Trust commented: 'Michela Wrong's assertion that the Kigali Genocide Memorial 'actively undermines' Rwanda's commitment to reconciliation overlooks its role as birthplace of peace and values education developed by the Aegis Trust, now built into Rwanda's national schools curriculum. This has led to both Tutsi and Hutu students giving up plans for armed violence, writes Aegis founder Dr James Smith in this response, which addresses Wrong's critique in more detail.'

A blooming good offer

Subscribe to The Spectator this spring and get 3 months for just £3

WRITTEN BY
Michela Wrong
Michela Wrong is the author of Do Not Disturb: The Story of a Political Murder and an African Regime Gone Bad, published by HarperCollins.

--
________________________________________________________________
-Ushobora kohereza message yawe kuri : rwandaforum@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwiyandikisha kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+subscribe@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwikura kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
-Contact: rwandaforumonline@gmail.com
____________________________________________________
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rwanda Forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/rwandaforum/CAEe4F%3Deq-zZ3t-RMaW-u3%2B-eVgdta%3DzNPqNckT6tSOu3yy42tQ%40mail.gmail.com.

[Rwanda Forum] The Dark Side of Rwanda’s Rebirth

The Dark Side of Rwanda's Rebirth

A new book explores the historical roots and contemporary fallout of Paul Kagame's aggressive foreign policy.

By , a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer in African Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Rwandan President Paul KagameRwandan President Paul Kagame

Rwandan President Paul Kagame reviews troops at Amahoro Stadium in Kigali during Liberation Day ceremonies marking the 16th anniversary of the end of the genocide on July 4, 2010. ADAM SCOTTI/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

"The dead are only dead when the living forget them," Jacquemain Shabani, a Congolese political figure close to President Félix Tshisekedi, recently said. "The victims of a massacre, of a genocide, are once again slaughtered whenever this evidence is denied."

Shabani was reacting to the words of Rwandan President Paul Kagame who, during an interview with France 24, had denied that foreign troops—including Rwandans—had ever committed massacres of civilian populations on Congolese territory in the years following the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Book cover Do Not DisturbBook cover Do Not Disturb

Do Not Disturb: The Story of a Political Murder and an African Regime Gone Bad , Michela Wrong, PublicAffairs, 512 pp., $32, March 2021

The recent history of Africa's Great Lakes region has in many ways been a dialogue between the living and the dead, and when the living fail in their obligations to honor the dead—and go so far as to deny the crimes that caused so many deaths—they perpetuate the cycle of conflict in the region.

Michela Wrong's Do Not Disturb: The Story of Political Murder and an African Regime Gone Bad is the fascinating account of how Kagame and his regime have come to embody this macabre dialogue between the dead and the living, which continues to haunt the region.

Captivating, gripping, and depressing, Do Not Disturb takes readers through the twisted, bloody—and often unknown—chapters in the history of Africa's Great Lakes region. It is a story of deceit, intrigue, lofty dreams, and broken promises.

Conflict in the region has killed millions of civilians over the years. The drivers, however, remain the same: exclusion and marginalization of citizens, power abuses, and disregard for human life—a situation that in the name of peace and stability the United Nations and Western powers have often been complicit in.

Rwanda's long-standing denialism over crimes that Rwandan armed forces and their Congolese allies reportedly committed during the Congo wars between 1996 and 2003 is the main obstacle to the much-needed peace and economic integration between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kagame's continued denial is particularly counterproductive considering that, for the first time since 1997, Congo has a president who has unequivocally declared his intention to make peace with Rwanda.

Whatever the nature of the personal relationship between the two leaders, peace and stability cannot be achieved so long as Congolese calls for justice for the victims go unheeded.


Ntarama Church In RwandaNtarama Church In Rwanda

A wooden cross and human skeletal remains rest on a brick surface in the Ntarama Church, which was destroyed during the genocide in Rwanda, circa 1994.LANE MONTGOMERY/GETTY IMAGES

Wrong's book achieves the rare feat of being both a historical chronicle and a rigorous analysis of current events. She anchors the book around the killing of Col. Patrick Karegeya, the exiled former head of the Rwandan External Security Organization who was strangled in his Johannesburg hotel suite on Dec. 31, 2013. Wrong weaves a trail of failed attempts and assassinations of high-profile Rwandans at home and abroad who had fallen out with the regime in Kigali.

Over the years, the killings have increased the fear factor among Rwandan diaspora communities in Sweden, Belgium, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, where the police often issue advisories and extend protection to targeted dissidents. While the Rwandan government categorically denies responsibility, prominent officials have publicly welcomed some of these killings. The publication of Do Not Disturb in March was particularly significant as it coincided with the lead-up to the commemoration of the Rwandan genocide.

Twenty-seven years ago, starting on April 6, 1994, for 100 days, foreign viewers watched on live television as a genocide unfolded. Images of piles of bloated and decomposing corpses floating down the Nyabarongo and Kagera rivers into Lake Victoria are etched in the memories of those who were old enough to comprehend the news.

Uganda is at the center of this story—and it is crucial to understanding what later happened in Rwanda.

For nearly 1 million Rwandans, most of them Tutsis, it was the end of the world. To the survivors, it was hell. Fueling massive displacement and misery, the cataclysm affected the entire region, from Tanzania to Burundi to Uganda to Congo, and as far away as Gabon and Cameroon. Millions of Rwandan, Congolese, and Burundian refugees and internally displaced people continue to bear the consequences.

Like a detective who returns to the crime scene of a cold case for clues that she might have missed, Wrong, who had covered the crisis in 1994, reexamines facets of key historical developments.

Uganda is at the center of this story—and it is crucial to understanding what later happened in Rwanda. Wrong introduces her readers to Uganda's turbulent political history through the power wrangling of the Milton Obote years from 1966 to 1971 and again from 1980 to 1985, the 1971 coup by Gen. Idi Amin Dada, and the travails of Gen. Tito Okello's army of northerners from 1985 to 1986.

The Ugandan Bush War, waged by Gen. Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) from 1980 to 1986, offers lessons in guerrilla warfare reminiscent of Fidel Castro's battle to topple Cuban President Fulgencio Batista. For a moment, the reader also gets a glimpse of a fleeting Pan-Africanism, which brought in support from Mozambique, Tanzania, and Libya.

National Resistance Army leader Yoweri MuseveniNational Resistance Army leader Yoweri Museveni

National Resistance Army leader Yoweri Museveni sits at his first cabinet meeting in Kampala, Uganda, after being sworn in as president of Uganda on Jan. 29, 1986. AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Along with Museveni's political vision and ambitions, Wrong's treatment of the NRA and the Bush War profiles an assortment of personalities, including Pecos Kutesa, Kizza Besigye, Jim Muhwezi, Kahinda Otafiire, Winnie Byanyima, and Salim Saleh. They made up the cast that emerged victorious from the struggle in 1986 and imposed the regime that has ruled Uganda for the past 35 years.

The NRA's success, however, also depended on the critical contribution of Banyarwanda refugee youths who had joined the group in significant numbers from its inception. Composed of Tutsis, Hutus, and Twas, the Banyarwanda community originated from Rwanda and settled in Uganda in waves dating back to the turn of the 20th century.

According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, during the pogroms of the Hutus against the Tutsis that took place from 1959 to 1964, between 40 and 70 percent of Tutsis left Rwanda. Of those fleeing, 50,000 to 70,000 went to Uganda, where they joined a larger community of Banyarwanda who had migrated to the area in the early 1900s and considered themselves fully Ugandan. The rest scattered across the region to Burundi, Tanzania, and Congo.

By 1990, the Banyarwanda represented 7.2 percent of Uganda's population of 18 million. Refugees or not, however, their status and standing within the country remained tenuous as other Ugandans treated them as Rwandans. (Even today, the Banyarwanda still fight for acceptance as citizens; in March, they initiated a campaign to rename themselves Abavandimwe, or "brethren," to prevent confusion with Rwandan nationals.)

Refugees, regardless of their socioeconomic status, education, or generation, are vulnerable to the effects of populism, nationalism, and other forms of discrimination and abuses in host countries. Though they are fleeing conflict, their presence often sparks xenophobia and causes new conflicts with native populations.

Back in the 1970s, Museveni knew that the Banyarwanda saw themselves as perennial outcasts and that their youngsters would have little to lose in joining a rebellion promising to topple the Obote regime.

Among the early recruits was the teenager Emmanuel Gisa (nom de guerre Fred Rwigyema), who trained with Museveni in Tanzania and Mozambique. His family fled Rwanda in 1960 when he was 3 years old. One of Museveni's original 27 fighters, Rwigyema participated in all the guerrilla war's major and critical campaigns. The much-celebrated and decorated fighter would eventually become a major general and deputy commander of the NRA, the national army. Rwigyema recruited Kagame—who had arrived in Uganda at the age of 2—into the NRA, where he served in intelligence. As a major after the war, Kagame attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas.

A third-generation Ugandan, Karegeya was not a refugee. His maternal great-grandfather had settled around Mbarara in 1926 from what the Belgians then called Ruanda-Urundi. With a family deeply rooted in Ugandan society, as a boy Karegeya spoke Runyankole, the local language, before the dominant Rwandan language, Kinyarwanda. But his family suffered the full measure of the Banyarwanda ethnic cleansing campaign of the Obote years, which denied them the full benefits of citizenship.

When Museveni took power in 1986, he faced instant, mounting public discontent over his reliance on the Banyarwanda, having rewarded them with key, sensitive positions. The backlash placed the president in a precarious situation and threatened his legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

For the Banyarwanda, service in the NRA did not shield them from xenophobic abuses. And for the refugees, it was a constant reminder that Uganda was not home. As Kagame once summed it up for a biographer, "You were always reminded, in one way or another, that you didn't belong here. You have no place that you can call yours."

In Rwanda, the Hutu regime of Juvénal Habyarimana refused to consider the return of the Banyarwanda, claimed that the country was full, and stripped them of their citizenship. For the Tutsis, the specter of ethnic cleansing remained ever present.

But the sons and daughters of refugees and migrants had had enough of the abuses and second-class citizenship in Uganda and set out to reclaim their rights and home in Rwanda.

For Museveni, there was only one optimal choice: support the exodus and arm them.


Paul KagamePaul Kagame

Paul Kagame, leader of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front meets, with a United Nations representative, not pictured, in Byumba, Rwanda, on May 11, 1994. GERARD JULIEN/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Wrong details the rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the world's first refugee insurgency, under the command of Rwigyema, who was killed on the second day of the invasion and later replaced by Kagame. Never had a group of African refugees taken up arms to blaze their way back home. It was a time of high hopes and dreams for new beginnings in a democratic Rwanda that would end the vicious cycles of mass killings.

For four years, the guerrillas suffered setbacks fighting the French- and Belgian-backed Rwandan Armed Forces and, earlier in the conflict, special forces from the Zairian Armed Forces. Through losses and wins on the battlefield, the RPF forced the Habyarimana regime into power-sharing negotiations, known as the Arusha Accords, that were to lay the foundation for a democratic Rwanda.

As offshoots of the NRA, both the RPF and Uganda's National Resistance Movement are entrenched in an aggressive guerrilla mindset.

The shooting down of Habyarimana's plane on April 6, 1994, triggered the genocide and ended that peace process. The RPF eventually won the costly war, but 27 years later, a democratic Rwanda has yet to materialize.

The insurgency, and later the army and its Congolese allies, left a trail of alleged revenge killings of Hutus in Rwanda and in Congo and other crimes documented in series of reports, including the Gersony Report, the United Nations Mapping Report, the Garretón Report, and Alison Des Forges's book Leave None to Tell the Story. Today, as a ruling party, the RPF has a firm grip on the country. It is also prone to regional adventurism.

As offshoots of the NRA, both the RPF and Uganda's National Resistance Movement are entrenched in an aggressive guerrilla mindset. For nearly three decades, they have antagonized their neighbors and each other for regional hegemony.

For instance, since assuming power, the Rwanda Defence Force and the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces have fought wars and supported rebellions in Congo whose impact still destabilizes the country today. Both Rwanda and Uganda have been accused of looting Congo's mineral and natural resources, such as gold and coltan, which is a disincentive for peace.

Uganda and Congo are currently embroiled in a legal battle at the International Court of Justice, where Congo seeks $4.3 billion in reparations from Uganda for damage caused in Ituri province.

A Congolese manA Congolese man

A Congolese man looks at the destruction of the Tshopo neighborhood of Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Rwandan and Ugandan armies had battled for a week before the Rwandans succeeded in pushing the Ugandan soldiers out June 11, 2000. HRVOJE HRANJSKI/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

At the height of the Second Congo War in 1999 and 2000, Rwandan and Ugandan forces, erstwhile allies, fought each other three times in Kisangani, a city of 600,000 people, and inflicted a heavy death toll and physical damage. Located at the bend in the Congo River, Kisangani is the gateway to an area rich in gold, diamond, timber, and other natural resources. Both armies sought exclusive control of the wealth. The relationship between the two countries has been bad since.

In 2013, the Southern African Development Community established the Force Intervention Brigade, composed of Malawian, Tanzanian, and South African troops, to fight the M23 militia in North Kivu, which was backed by Rwanda and Uganda.

Uganda's military interventions stretch from Congo to South Sudan to the Central African Republic and Somalia. This would be an impressive and costly undertaking for any rich country. Like Rwanda, Uganda is poor and dependent on donor charity.

Having emerged from the shadows of the late Mobutu Sese Seko of then-Zaire and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, the two would-be regional hegemons of the Cold War era, Museveni sees himself as the main interlocutor of Western powers and the regional kingmaker. His former protégés in Rwanda, however, contest his claim and seek that role for themselves.


Patrick KaregeyaPatrick Karegeya

Col. Patrick Karegeya, the exiled former head of the Rwandan External Security Organization who was strangled in his Johannesburg hotel suite in 2013, is pictured in Kigali, Rwanda, in this undated photo. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

For Karegeya, who was intelligence chief during the Congo wars, Rwandans invaded their big neighbor because they had chosen to externalize the battlefield and preempt the threat posed by the génocidaires and elements of the vanquished Rwandan Armed Forces who had regrouped across the border. "Externalizing the war zone is part of that policy and so is buffering," he told Wrong at the time. "So, because of our relative sizes, we will never leave DRC, for example, until there is a government in Kinshasa we can trust. Never again will we allow a mass killing of our people, never again will we allow a war on Rwandan territory. Never again will we allow anyone to lay a finger on a Tutsi head."

Assassination attempts and the killings of Rwandan dissidents in South Africa resulted in the expulsion of three Rwandan diplomats in 2014. Rwanda reciprocated and ordered six South African diplomats out of the country.

Long before he fled Rwanda in 2007, when he still helped set the country's foreign policy as intelligence chief, Karegeya's response to Wrong's inquiry as to why Rwanda undertook assassinations of its citizens foreshadowed his own death.

"You have to understand. … We are a small and densely populated country," he told Wrong. "We have a higher population density than any other country in Africa. So, we have no space for another war. We just don't have the strategic geographical depth." He expanded this thought and insisted that "every threat will be dealt with preemptively, and extraterritorially, because we do not have room for it to take place on our sovereign territory. So, what you call 'murder' is not a crime—it's an act of war by other means, and if it took place in any other circumstances, we would be congratulated, praised for it."

Further justifying his position, Karegeya took the reader into the RPF mindset and concluded: "There are two countries in the world that have this doctrine, us and Israel. This is how Israel sees things, how Mossad acts, and this is how we see it. We will never allow our enemy to land a blow on us and remain standing."

In the end, Karegeya fell prey to a policy that he had promoted and defended.

The comparison with Israel is hyperbolic. The 1994 genocide was a culmination of cyclical mass killings among Rwandans that started in 1959 and have come to define the modern history of the country, with Hutus and Tutsis seeking to impose their supremacy over the others. Moreover, unlike Mossad assassination campaigns against foreigners, the targets of these assassinations are fellow Rwandans.

In the end, Karegeya fell prey to a policy that he had promoted and defended. For, as far as the RPF was concerned, he posed a threat to the regime. As an exiled former intelligence chief, he was among the few people who intimately knew the strengths and fault lines of Rwanda's security and defense systems. As an opposition leader, his ambition to topple the Kigali regime made him an enemy of the state and a target of his former colleagues. The Rwanda National Congress, the opposition party that he co-founded, was said to maintain a militia in Congo, like the Hutu militias he once hunted down.

It was a far cry from his childhood in Uganda.

Reflecting on his assassination, Jane Keshoro, Karegeya's mother, emphasized his identity. "I'm a Ugandan. Both my father and mother were Ugandan," she said. She told Wrong how surprised she was that her son got so involved in Rwanda. "It was a mistake."

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer in African Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is a veteran of the United States Marine Corps Reserve.

--
________________________________________________________________
-Ushobora kohereza message yawe kuri : rwandaforum@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwiyandikisha kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+subscribe@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwikura kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
-Contact: rwandaforumonline@gmail.com
____________________________________________________
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rwanda Forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/rwandaforum/CAEe4F%3DfYKX0o_bU9RXF%3Dwx8u6YsSpr_9XtUF07F_mfENb4Xo0w%40mail.gmail.com.

Sunday, 12 May 2024

[Rwanda Forum] La guerre dans les évolutions du Congo-Kinshasa

La guerre dans les évolutions du Congo-Kinshasa

https://www.cairn.info/revue-afrique-contemporaine1-2005-3-page-47.htm

ENSEMBLE DES MASSACRES DE CIVILS D'OCTOBRE 1996 À AOÛT 1997

https://www.hrw.org/legacy/french/reports/drc1997a/kabila-04.htm

--
________________________________________________________________
-Ushobora kohereza message yawe kuri : rwandaforum@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwiyandikisha kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+subscribe@googlegroups.com
-Ushobora kwikura kuri iyo groupe wandikira: rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com
-Contact: rwandaforumonline@gmail.com
____________________________________________________
---
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Rwanda Forum" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to rwandaforum+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/rwandaforum/CAEe4F%3DefEvXkCage1QDy6uifsaMeeTiPBxWDjOMcrfXsvLfkxQ%40mail.gmail.com.

-“The root cause of the Rwandan tragedy of 1994 is the long and past historical ethnic dominance of one minority ethnic group to the other majority ethnic group. Ignoring this reality is giving a black cheque for the Rwandan people’s future and deepening resentment, hostility and hatred between the two groups.”

-« Ce dont j’ai le plus peur, c’est des gens qui croient que, du jour au lendemain, on peut prendre une société, lui tordre le cou et en faire une autre ».

-“The hate of men will pass, and dictators die, and the power they took from the people will return to the people. And so long as men die, liberty will never perish.”

-“I have loved justice and hated iniquity: therefore I die in exile.

-“The price good men pay for indifference to public affairs is to be ruled by evil men.”

READ MORE RECENT NEWS AND OPINIONS

Popular Posts

WebMD Health Channel - Sex & Relationships

Love Lectures

How We Made It In Africa – Insight into business in Africa

David DeAngelo - Dating Questions For Men

Christian Carter - Dating Questions For Women

Women - The Huffington Post

Recent Articles About Effective Communication Skills and Self Development